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CONSTITUTIONAL SHOWDOWNS
ERIC A. POSNERt & ADRIAN VERMEULE tt
Constitutional law and politics is full of (what the headlines call)
"showdowns" between and among branches of government.1 When
the Democratic Congress began investigating the dismissal of United
States Attorneys, congressional committees issued subpoenas and the
White House asserted executive privilege to block advisers to the
President from being forced to testify.2 This is a familiar Washington
pattern, which usually ends in a bargained compromise between the
legislative and executive branches, but occasionally ends up in a large-
scale showdown. In the latter case, the result may be litigation that
creates a judicial precedent, a political settlement that creates a non-
judicial precedent, or both.
Showdowns occur between the President and the courts, between
Congress and the courts, as well as between the President and Con-
gress. Indeed, some showdowns involve all three branches simultane-
ously, or threaten to do so. When congressional committees issue
subpoenas and the executive asserts privilege, the courts may eventu-
ally be asked to enforce the subpoenas. When Franklin Roosevelt at-
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I See, e.g., Edward Epstein, Dems Seek Showdown on War; House, Senate Leaders 7 Push
Legislation That Would Force Bush To Withdraw Troops, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 9, 2007, at Al
(describing proposals by congressional Democrats that would mandate troops leaving
Iraq against President Bush's opposition to such measures); Maura Reynolds, Senate
Vote Nears on Guantanamo Detainee Rights; Showdown Is Set Today on a Measure That Would
Bar Prisoners'Access to Federal Court, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2005, at A14 (detailing legisla-
tive action to overturn a Supreme Court decision); Reynolds Holding, The Executive
Privilege Showdown, TIME.COM, Mar. 21, 2007, http://www.time.com/time/nation/
article/0,8599,1601450,00.html (describing the right the executive branch claims it
has "to withhold certain information from Congress").
2 See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Bush Moves Toward Showdown with Congress on Executive
Privilege, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2007, at A23 (explaining the clash between President
Bush's assertion of his "right to unfettered and candid advice from his top aides" and
the "Congressional right to conduct oversight").
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tempted to pack the Supreme Court, the attempt implicated congres-
sional as well as judicial prerogatives, because a bill was necessary to
expand the number of seats on the Court. Some legislators opposed
the bill even though (they claimed) they would have favored a consti-
tutional amendment.
3
The idea of a constitutional showdown seems, at first, hopelessly
vague. But informal talk of showdowns is extremely widespread and
persistent in both scholarship and in the popular press, and there is
undoubted pretheoreical appeal to the category, which seems to cap-
ture one major mechanism of constitutional development. Our pro-
ject here is to put some theoretical backbone into the idea of a consti-
tutional showdown.4 We attempt to give a usable definition of the
idea, analyze the circumstances under which showdowns will or will
not occur, and offer some normative observations about whether the
American constitutional system tends to produce too many or too few
3 See Adrian Vermeule, Political Constraints on Supreme Court Reform, 90 MINN. L.
REv. 1154, 1170 (2006).
4 The closest analogue in the literature is the useful idea of "constitutional hard-
ball." See Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Hardball, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 523, 523
(2004) (defining "constitutional hardball" as "political claims and practices-legislative
and executive initiatives-that are without much question within the bounds of exist-
ing constitutional doctrine and practice but that are nonetheless in some tension with
existing pre-constitutional understandings"). Although Tushnet uses some of the same
examples we will discuss, Tushnet specifies his idea by reference to preexisting consti-
tutional understandings, while we specify ours by reference to the downstream prece-
dent-setting effects of showdowns. See infra Part I.B. Moreover, Tushnet embeds "con-
stitutional hardball" in a jurisprudential framework structured around Bruce
Ackerman's theory of constitutional transformation, whereas we use a standard wel-
fare-economic framework. As for Ackerman, his idea of a "constitutional moment" is a
subset of constitutional showdowns; many episodes that count as showdowns under our
definition are not constitutional moments in Ackerman's sense. See I BRUCE ACKER-
MAN, WE THE PEOPLE 22 (1991) (describing "concrete historical processes that allowed
Americans to transform moments of passionate sacrifice and excited mobilization into
lasting legal achievements"). Jack Balkin and Sanford Levinson distinguish between
constitutional crises in which actors concede they are violating the Constitution (usu-
ally, they claim, in order to save the Constitution), and crises in which actors claim to
be acting within the boundaries of the Constitution. See Sanford Levinson & Jack
Balkin, Three Types of Constitutional Crisis (2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with authors). This is a legal distinction orthogonal to our concept of a showdown,
which might fall into either category. (We omit Balkin and Levinson's third category,
which is not relevant here.) Finally, there is also a related private-law literature on liti-
gation and settlement. See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication
as a Private Good, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 235 (1979) (discussing incentives of individuals to
resolve disputes in a socially optimal way); Steven Shavell, The Level of Litigation: Private
Versus Social Optimality of Suit and Settlement, 19 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 99 (1999) (com-
paring the socially optimal level of litigation to privately determined levels of litigation).
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showdowns, and whether the showdowns it does produce occur under
socially optimal circumstances.
Part I defines showdowns both conceptually and by example and
organizes our succeeding claims. Part II examines the social costs and
benefits of showdowns. The main benefit is that showdowns clarify
the constitutional allocation of powers, reducing transaction costs and
uncertainty in later periods or generations. The main costs are that
showdowns can produce needless conflict and erroneous or prema-
ture resolution of constitutional issues in the current period, given
that circumstances and constitutional controversies are constantly
changing over time.
Part III argues that the observed rate and distribution of show-
downs will in all likelihood diverge from the socially optimal rate and
distribution of showdowns. The branches of government and the offi-
cials who staff them will produce showdowns when the private benefits
exceed the private costs, not when the social benefits exceed the social
costs. Although it is not clear, in theory, whether showdowns will be
too many or too few, we suggest some institutional reasons for think-
ing that the American constitutional order produces too few show-
downs and too much uncertainty about the allocation of constitu-
tional powers.
In Part IV, we elicit the main normative implication: where the
social benefits of clarifying the constitutional allocation of authority
for future generations are large, and the countervailing costs of con-
stitutional conflict and erroneous or premature resolution of issues
are low, institutions should be encouraged to practice the active virtues
as opposed to the passive virtues.' Rather than ducking constitutional
conflicts, they should be encouraged-through incentive-based insti-
tutional design, public suasion, or other means-to engage in more
constitutional showdowns than they would otherwise choose. A brief
conclusion follows.
I. PRELIMINARIES
We will define constitutional showdowns both extensionally, by
examples and paradigm cases (in Section A), and intensionally, by
necessary and sufficient criteria (in Sections B and C). The former
See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 111-99 (2d ed. 1986)
(describing "the passive virtues" that counsel the Supreme Court against deciding
some constitutional questions on the merits).
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procedure is appropriate for family-resemblance complexes, where
there are many related ideas that share no single common property or
defining feature; the idea of a constitutional showdown doubtless has
a family-resemblance structure of this sort. Nonetheless we think it
will be useful to the reader to attempt a conceptual definition as well,
if only to indicate more clearly where our theoretical concerns lie.
A. Examples
To motivate the later discussion, and to indicate the sorts of cases
we have in mind, consider the following examples of the three major
categories of showdowns we will discuss.
1. Presidential-Congressional Showdowns
Impeachments are the most dramatic constitutional showdowns,
and inevitably create precedents. AndrewJohnson's impeachment for
violating the Tenure of Office Act, which forbade presidential removal
of certain cabinet officers without congressional approval, was de-
feated by a single vote; the Supreme Court later cited this episode to
support a conclusive constitutional rule in favor of presidential power
to remove executive officers,6 or at least "purely" executive officers.7
The Nixon impeachment had a double precedential effect, both cre-
ating legal forms that were used in the Clinton impeachment, and
provoking a constitutional showdown between Nixon and the Court
8that itself created ajudicial precedent on executive privilege.
Struggles over appointments and executive privilege can, of
course, result in constitutional showdowns even where no impeach-
ment eventuates. A pure example of a constitutional showdown oc-
curred when
[o]ne year into President [George H.W.] Bush's term, Congress
passed... a provision prohibiting the United States from spending any
money authorized for international conferences on the U.S. delegation
to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe unless that
delegation included representatives of the Commission on Security and
6 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 176-77 (1926) (holding unconstitutional a
law denying the President unrestricted power to remove the postmaster).
7 Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 626-28 (1935) (limiting the
Myers decision such that the power of removal did not apply to members of the Federal
Trade Commission, a body with legislative and judicial duties).
8 See generally Akhil Reed Amar & Neal Kumar Katyal, Executive Privileges and Immu-
nities: The Nixon and Clinton Cases, 108 HARV. L. REV. 701 (1995).
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Cooperation in Europe. This Commission was composed almost entirely
of members appointed by the legislative branch.
Given the far-reaching challenge to powers of the presidency, Presi-
dent Bush's response was extremely forceful. He announced that the
provision was unconstitutional, and that he would refuse to enforce
it ....
... [W]hile the House of Representatives' lawyer bitterly complained
about the President's refusal to enforce the law, members of Congress
took no further action.)
2. Presidential-Judicial Showdowns
Here too some cases result in a judicial precedent and some do
not. In the latter situation, consider Lincoln's decision to defy a ha-
beas corpus order issued by ChiefJustice Taney (in Ex parte Menyman)
during the opening days of the war.'0 This counts as a showdown be-
cause Lincoln's action was based on a particular view of presidential
power to defy the courts in situations of extreme crisis, where doing so
is necessary to save "all the laws, but one";" because the judges acqui-
esced through inaction, and through extreme deference to Lincoln
until the end of the Civil War; and because Lincoln's action created a
(nonjudicial) constitutional precedent that clarified the constitutional
lines of authority and is cited to this day by constitutional theorists
with various views of presidential power, judicial power, and the role
of emergencies in constitutional law. 12
The former situation is exemplified by some of the most famous
cases in constitutional law, such as the Steel Seizure case, Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sauyer,'3 and the Watergate tapes case, United States
v. Nixon.'4 In the former, the Court rejected a claim by President Tru-
man that he had constitutional power to seize steel plants to prevent a
9 John 0. McGinnis, Constitutional Review by the Executive in Foreign Affairs and War
Powers: A Consequence of Rational Choice in the Separation of Powers, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Autumn 1993, at 293, 309-11.
10 ExparteMerryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487).
1 Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special Session (July 4, 1861), in 4
THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 421, at 430 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953)
(emphasis omitted).
12 In addition, consider Andrew Jackson's refusal to comply with the Supreme
Court's decision in Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832), which held that Georgia
laws had no force in Indian territory.
13 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
14 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
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work stoppage that would have cut off war material for American
forces in Korea;15 in the latter, the Court rejected a "generalized"
claim of executive privilege and forced Nixon to turn over Oval Office
recordings that had been lawfully subpoenaed in a grand jury investi-• 16
gation. In both cases, the President, unlike Lincoln, promptly ac-
quiesced by obeying the Court's orders, and the cases have set the
terms of various separation of powers controversies to the present day.
3. Congressional-Judicial Showdowns
A central storyline of American constitutional history involves
showdowns between Congress and the judiciary." As usual, such
showdowns have created precedents even when no judicial decision
ensued. During Reconstruction, the Republican Congress manipu-
lated the number ofJustices in order to deny Democrat Andrew John-
son appointments to the Court, first lowering the number of seats and
then raising the number when Ulysses S. Grant came into office. 8
Congress's actions during this period were a prominent precedent for
Franklin Roosevelt's Court-packing plan; the failure of that plan itself
set a precedent that weighs against future manipulation of the Court's
membership.
Other actions of the Reconstruction Congress did result in judicial
precedents. One was to enact legislation that deprived the Court ofju-
risdiction to hear a pending case, thus preventing the Court-were the
legislation upheld-from limiting congressional power to deploy mili-
tary commissions in the former Confederacy. Bowing to the political
winds, the Court upheld the jurisdiction-stripping statute in Ex parte
McCarde.19 The decision has served as an important precedent in many
later episodes and cases; although its authority has been questioned by
commentators, 20 and the Court has in later episodes typically used ag-
gressive statutory construction to find jurisdiction while avoiding the
15 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 589.
16 Nixon, 418 U.S. at 713.
17 See generally CHARLES GARDNER GEYH, WHEN COURTS & CONGRESS COLLIDE:
THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF AMERICA'SJUDICIAL SYSTEM (2006).
18 Id. at 66-67.
19 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 515 (1868).
20 Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part II: Recon-
struction's Political Court, 91 GEO. L.J. 1, 36 (2002) ("Given the odor of politics [at the
time of the Court's decision], it is somewhat surprising that the Court's dismissal of
McCardle frequently has been invoked as support for the proposition that Congress has
broad power to remove cases from the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.").
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constitutional questions, this sort of controversial posthistory is the fate
of many prominent precedents, both judicial and nonjudicial.
B. Definitions
We will say that a constitutional showdown is (1) a disagreement
between branches of government over their constitutional powers that
(2) ends in the total or partial acquiescence by one branch in the
views of the other and that (3) creates a constitutional precedent.
2'
Constitutional showdowns are a subset of legal showdowns generally;
the latter would include, for example, a disagreement between the
President and the courts over whether the President has been granted
particular powers by statute, rather than by constitutional law.
Our definition embodies several assumptions. First, we will often
speak of "institutional interests" or the interests of branches of gov-
ernment; these formulations are just shorthand for the point that in-
dividuals are in some cases motivated to promote the interests of insti-
tutions to which they belong, although in other cases they are not.
22
We relax this simplifying assumption in later discussion, but for now
we will use personified branches-the President, Congress, and the
courts. The justification for this assumption is twofold: it simplifies
the presentation of our claims without serious loss of accuracy, and
each branch contains internal rules for aggregating individual votes
21 Peter Spiro offers an illuminating treatment of the way in which war powers
controversies acquire precedential force.
[T]he legal significance of any such episode will hinge on three elements.
First, it is actions that count, not words; mere assertions of executive or legisla-
tive authority are largely irrelevant in the long run, the chaff of institutional
bravado. Second, in order to take on lawmaking significance, the conduct
must be known to the other branch; secret operations will have no constitu-
tional significance until they are made known to Congress and it has had an
opportunity to respond. Third, the other branch must have accepted or ac-
quiesced in the action. Any conduct that satisfies (or even arguably satisfies)
these requirements will become part of the precedential mix; a single histori-
cal episode can create incremental elements of custom in the same way that a
singlejudicial decision will incrementally change court-made doctrine.
Peter J. Spiro, War Powers and the Sirens of Formalism, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1338, 1356
(1993) (book review) (footnotes omitted). Our definition draws on Spiro's but gener-
alizes it to a broader range of constitutional settings.
22 See DarylJ. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118 HARV.
L. REv. 915, 955 (2005) ( "When legislators do find it politically advantageous to take a
position, .... that position is mostly determined not by the institutional interest of
Congress but by the views of their constituents (and, difficult to disaggregate, their
own personal policy preferences).").
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into institutional decisions, such as statutes, judicial precedents, and
executive orders.23 Likewise, we also bracket the role of political par-
ties in a separation of powers system, and take up that issue in later
discussion as well.
Second, we assume that constitutional showdowns create prece-
dents, either judicial or nonjudicial, and that these precedents have
some positive force in decision making during later periods. Of
course, showdowns are neither necessary nor sufficient to create con-
stitutional precedents, but they have a probabilistic tendency to do so,
which is sufficient to motivate our assumption. Subsequently, we dis-
cuss alternative mechanisms of interstitial or small-scale change that
also create constitutional precedents.
When showdowns create precedents, the force of such precedents
may be large or small, depending on circumstances and context. De-
spite skepticism about the force of both judicial and nonjudicial prece-
dents, our assumption is minimal. Nonjudicial precedents, like judicial
ones, are rarely the only consideration that later decision makers take
into account and are often overridden or ignored because preferences
or political circumstances have changed; but this does not mean the
precedents never existed in the first place. "Individual episodes will, of
course, have more or less weight in the same way that decisions from
some courts are more meaningful than from others, and in this respect
such factors as frequency, consistency, and regularity will be important
to determining the constitutional probity of a particular practice."24
Note that what starts off as a showdown might end as a compro-
mise, with the disagreement papered over and neither side acquiesc-
ing at all in the other side's claim to authority. Or the underlying
source of dispute might resolve itself before a true impasse is reached.
We will, by definitional fiat, decline to call these situations showdowns,
albeit with the proviso that the line between a showdown and ordinary
mechanisms of constitutional development is a fine one.
23 See McGinnis, supra note 9, at 295. Actually, there are two slightly distinct issues
here. First, even where a branch is staffed by a single individual, such as the President,
there may be a divergence between "the interest of the man" and the "rights of the
place." See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961). Second, the branches are staffed by multiple actors and thus face internal
problems of aggregation. This is obvious for Congress and the judiciary; it is also true
in practice of the executive branch, which includes not only the President but a welter
of cabinet officers, agencies, and other entities. For now, we bracket both problems
and assume that all branches act like unitary individuals who rationally pursue the
branch's objective interests.
24 Spiro, supra note 21, at 1356.
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Several mechanisms can cause the settlements that occur in ear-
lier episodes to have positive force in later times. The "civilizing force
of hypocrisy"2 5 makes it positively costly for decision makers to disavow
a principle they relied on to their benefit at an earlier time, although
in some cases the benefits of opportunistic disavowals of precedent
are worth the cost. Precedents may create focal points that coordinate
behavior;26 indeed, focal points can affect behavior even in interac-
27tions that mix cooperative and distributive motives -circumstances
where all branches involved want to coordinate, yet the branches have
different preferences about which rule or practice to coordinate
upon. Precedents reduce the costs of decision making, so that in later
periods decision makers may follow them even if they would have pre-
ferred a different rule if deciding on a blank slate; more nebulously,
precedents set in an earlier showdown tend to ossify into institutional
routines and individual habits, and may even become internalized by
actors who develop a sense of legal obligation to follow the precedent.
We return to this last possibility shortly.
Third, the constitutional "precedent" that is created by a show-
down may, but need not, be a judicial precedent. It may also be an• 28
unwritten constitutional norm or convention 2-a practice that is
widely understood as a settlement of a constitutional question and
that is regular or stable over time, although it need not be eternal.
Constitutional conventions in this sense include the refusal of any
president after Washington and before Franklin Roosevelt to stand for
a third term, a convention that eventually collapsed, and the norm
that the President need not submit treaties to the Senate during the
negotiating phase, but need only obtain ex post Senate ratification.
The latter practice was also established by Washington but has per-
sisted to the present day.29
25 JON ELSTER, ALCHEMIES OF THE MIND 341, 402 (1999).
26 See THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 67-68 (2d ed. 1980) (ar-
guing that "[pirecedent seems to exercise an influence that greatly exceeds its logical
importance or legal force" and noting that, in the context of explicit bargaining, the
parties tend to reach settlements that align with those previously determined in similar
situations, as "often it seems that there is simply no heart left in the bargaining when it
takes place under the shadow of some dramatic and conspicuous precedent").
27 On the role of focal points in the Battle of the Sexes game, see JAMES D. MOR-
ROW, GAME THEORY FOR POLITICAL SCIENTISTS 94-97 (1994).
28 See Jon Elster, Unwritten Constitutional Norms (2007) (unpublished manu-
script, on file with authors).
See STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC McKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM 55-58 (1993)
(describing Washington's sole appearance before the Senate concerning a treaty un-
der negotiation and how the resulting confusion confirmed that such consultations
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Fourth, the requirement of acquiescence has a special meaning
and theoretical significance. By acquiescence, we will again refer to
the observed practice or behavior of the branches, rather than to their
official positions. It is common that branches will give in or strike a
bargain that effectively acquiesces in the views of another branch, all
the while disclaiming any surrender of official powers or intention to
set a precedent. Presidents, for example, routinely waive claims of ex-
ecutive privilege, allowing even their closest advisers to testify before
Congress, while denying that they have compromised their constitu-
tional prerogatives. 30 In our definition, such events count as show-
downs that have set nonjudicial precedents in favor of the constitu-
tional power of Congress to require testimony from executive officials.
Another complication is that acquiescence can be total or partial; one
branch might clearly cede to another some, but not all, of what the
other branch claims. This does not affect the analysis, but complicates
the exposition, so we will usually address only the limiting case.
The theoretical motivation for this behavioral definition of acqui-
escence is the following. We are interested in legal uncertainty in the
American constitutional system. Where a branch has repeatedly ac-
quiesced in practice to the views of another branch, the effective level
of legal uncertainty is low even if the acquiescing branch has formally
or nominally adhered to its position. Actors will anticipate that the
practice will likely, though not certainly, be repeated if a similar con-
troversy arises. In such cases legal uncertainty would be reduced even
further if the acquiescing branch had formally knuckled under, abjur-
ing its previous constitutional position; but that reduction will be of
marginal importance, at least where the behavior has become regular-
ized. Branches cannot avoid creating precedents just by using magic
words. Other actors will adjust their behavior based on their best es-
timates of how the branch behaves, notjust on what it says.
Finally, we will focus on showdowns between or among the three
major branches of the national government. However, other actors
were impracticable, though ex post presentation for ratification fit the requirements of
both the Constitution and political expediency).
so Regarding those alleged prerogatives, see HAROLD C. RELYEA & TODD B.
TATELMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., PRESIDENTIAL ADVISERS' TESTIMONY BEFORE CON-
GRESSIONAL COMMITTEES: AN OVERVIEW 27 (2007), available at http://www.fas.org/
irp/crs/RL31351.pdf ("The range of executive branch officials who may appropriately
assert executive privilege before congressional committees, and the circumstances un-
der which they may do so, remains unresolved by the courts and is a matter that may
be determined by case-by-case accommodation between the political branches." (cita-
tions omitted)).
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engage in showdowns as well. There can be showdowns between po-
litical parties, as when the majority and minority parties in the Senate
disagree about the extent to which the minority party can block votes,
put members on committees, and influence procedural rules.3 A
dramatic example of such a showdown occurred when members of
the Texas legislature tried to leave the state in order to prevent a quo-
rum from forming and the majority party tried to have them ar-
rested.32 There can be showdowns between sections of the country:
the showdown over slavery between the North and the South led to
the Civil War. There can be showdowns between the national gov-
ernment and the state governments, as occurred when Orval Faubus,
the governor of Arkansas, refused to comply with an order of the Su-
preme Court, and President Eisenhower deputized the Arkansas Na-
tional Guard. And showdowns often involve overlapping political divi-
sions, as when a branch controlled by one party reaches an impasse
with a branch controlled by another party. In all cases, agents granted
political authority by the Constitution disagree about the contours of
their authority and refuse to back down in the face of competing
claims by other agents.
Our assumption that showdowns can create nonjudicial prece-
dents is related, but not identical, to the idea that customary practices
are a source of law. In the theory of international law, customary law
consists of practices-behavioral regularities-followed from an in-
ternalized sense of legal obligation, or opinio juris. Theorists of do-
mestic constitutional law3 and foreign relations law 4 have adapted
opinio juris to identify law that arises from interbranch interactions,
such as the President's power to withdraw public land from private
acquisition" or to deploy forces abroad in small-scale operations, like
the invasion of Grenada, without congressional approval. 6 All these
31 We incorporate political parties into the analysis in Part Ill.C, infra.
2 See Texas Search for Democrats Is Ruled Illegal, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2003, at A7.
3 See, e.g., Michael J. Glennon, The Use of Custom in Resolving Separation of Powers
Disputes, 64 B.U. L. REV. 109, 111-12 (1984) (analyzing the role of custom as "an extratex-
tual source of authority" in resolving disputes concerning the separation of powers).
See Spiro, supra note 21, at 1340 (proposing that, in the law of war powers,
"[c]ustom dominates in place of text").
35 See United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 469 (1915) (upholding the
President's ability to issue such orders as "a long continued practice"). See also Glen-
non, supra note 33, at 115-16, for a further discussion of the role played by custom in
the Court's reasoning.
36 See Spiro, supra note 21, at 1356 (maintaining that while, when viewed in isola-
tion, "congressional acquiescence in the invasion of Grenada may have been of mid-
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theorists deploy the idea as a criterion for winnowing law out of the
larger set of behavioral regularities or governmental practices; the
idea is that some behavioral regularities, such as the practice that na-
tions send diplomats to the funerals of past heads of state, or the prac-
tice of Supreme Court justices attending the State of the Union ad-
dress, are not felt by the actors themselves to have any legally
obligatory character and thus cannot count as law.
For our purposes, however, opinio juris is a sufficient but not a
necessary condition for showdowns to have precedential force. All
that matters is that showdowns create some sort of precedential con-
straint that enters into the decisions of subsequent actors, whether or
not it is decisive (just asjudicial precedents might or might not be de-
cisive, but are always relevant). One way that positive precedential
force might arise is that actors internalize and take to be legally
obligatory the practices of the past, but there are other mechanisms
that also give rise to precedential force, as we have mentioned.
Precedents may just be patterns of behavior that parties recognize as
providing focal points that permit cooperation or coordination.3 7
Under the civilizing force of hypocrisy, actors will incur a cost if they
act too opportunistically in disavowing earlier positions whenever it
suits their interests, and this cost will affect their later decisions. But
that does not require-indeed it implicitly denies-that the actors
have internalized the earlier practices as legally obligatory.
C. Authority, Policy, and Public Opinion
Here we clarify some elements of our definition, particularly the
condition that actors must disagree about the allocation of constitu-
tional authority. Showdowns occur when the location of constitu-
tional authority for making an important policy decision is ambiguous
or contested, and multiple political agents (branches, parties, sec-
tions, governments) have a strong interest in establishing that the au-
thority lies with them. Although agents often have an interest in ne-
gotiating a settlement, asymmetric information about the interests
and bargaining power of opposing parties will sometimes prevent such
dling significance," when "added to dozens of similar cases spanning almost the full
length of American history, it served to confirm the President's capacity to undertake
such incursions without prior legislative approval").
37 See infra Part I.C. For the argument that this is indeed the appropriate interpre-
tation of opinio juris in international law, see JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER,
THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 23-43 (2005).
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a settlement from being achieved. The result is a showdown. Ulti-
mately, however, someone must yield; this yielding to or acquiescence
in the claimed authority of another agent helps clarify constitutional
lines of authority, so that the next time the issue arises, a constitu-
tional impasse can be avoided. From a normative standpoint, consti-
tutional showdowns thus have an important benefit, but they are cer-
tainly not costless. As long as the showdown lasts, the government
may be paralyzed, unable to make important policy decisions, at least
with respect to the issue under dispute.
1. Preliminaries
We begin by examining a simplified version of our problem, one
involving just two agents-Congress and the executive. We assume for
now that each agent is a unitary actor with a specific set of interests
and capacities. We also assume that each agent has a slightly different
utility function, one that reflects its separate set of constituents. If we
take the median voter as a baseline, we might assume that Congress is
a bit to the left (or right) of the median voter, while the President is a
bit to the right (or left). We will assume that the two agents are at an
equal distance from the median, and that the preferences of the
population are symmetrically distributed, so that the median voter will
be indifferent between whether the President or Congress makes a
particular decision, assuming that they have equal information. 38 But
we will also assume that the President has better information about
some types of problems and Congress has better information about
other types of problems, so that, from the median voter's standpoint,
it is best for the President to make decisions about the first type of
problem and for Congress to make decisions about the second type of
problem.
38 We do not mean to imply that the expected policy choice will be the median
voter's ideal policy choice; we assume that the optimal institutional allocation of au-
thority minimizes the deviation from the median voter's preferences relative to other
institutional arrangements.
39 In setting up the problem in this way, we exclude the possibility that one or
both agents would prefer not to have authority over a particular issue because the issue
is highly sensitive and politically dangerous. Such an assumption underlies some theo-
ries, such as the theory of the "regulatory lottery," according to which Congress grants
power to agencies in order to avoid having to make a politically sensitive decision. See
Peter H. Aranson, Ernest Gellhorn & Glen 0. Robinson, A Theory of Legislative Delega-
tion, 68 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 7 (1982). We have criticized this view in earlier work. See
Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L.
REv. 1721, 1746-47 (2002). Because we cannot think of historical examples where two
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Suppose, for example, that the nation is at war and the govern-
ment must decide whether to terminate the war soon or allow it to
continue. Congress and the President may agree about what to do, of
course. But if they disagree, their disagreement may arise from one or
both of two sources. First, Congress and the President have different
information. For example, the President may have better information
about the foreign policy ramifications of a premature withdrawal,
while Congress has better information about home-front morale.
These different sources of information lead the executive to believe
that the war should continue, while Congress believes the war should
end soon. Second, Congress and the President have different prefer-
ences because of electoral pressures of their different constituents.
Suppose, for example, that the President depends heavily on the con-
tinued support of arms suppliers, while crucial members of Congress
represent districts dominated by war protestors. Thus, although the
median voter might want the war to continue for a moderate time, the
President prefers an indefinite extension while Congress prefers an
immediate termination.
So far, we have explained why the President and Congress might
disagree about when to terminate the war, but mere policy disagree-
ment does not result in a showdown. Showdowns arise only when
there is a disagreement about authority. If Congress believes that the
President has the sole authority to terminate the war, then the Presi-
dent's view will prevail. Congress may try to pressure or influence him
by offering support for other programs desired by the President or by
trying to rile up the public, but these activities are part of normal poli-
tics and do not constitute a constitutional showdown. Similarly, if the
President believes that Congress has the sole authority to terminate
the war, then Congress's view will prevail. This outcome is shown in
cell (3) in Table 1. Similarly, no showdown occurs when the two
branches agree both about authority and policym-for example, if the
President decides and Congress agrees with his decision (cell (1)).
The first column represents the domain of normal politics.
branches have tried to slough authority over an issue to each other, we think that this
concern can be safely ignored. For the contrary view, see Levinson, supra note 22, at
937 (arguing that accretion of powers by a government entity is not necessarily a driv-
ing motive).
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Table 1: Congressional-Presidential Showdowns
Agreement Disagreement
About Authority About Authority
Agreement
About Policy (1) No Showdown (2) Possible Showdown
Disagreement (3) Acquiescence (4) Showdown
About Policy
Showdowns arise only when Congress and the President disagree
about who decides. Here, there are two further possibilities. First,
Congress and the President disagree about who decides but agree about
the correct policy outcome (cell (2)). In these situations, which arise
with some frequency, the two branches are often tempted to paper over
their differences because an immediate policy choice is not at stake.
But sometimes a showdown will occur. We will discuss this special case
in Part II.B. Second, Congress and the President disagree about the
policy outcome and about authority (cell (4)). In this case, showdowns
are likely because a policy decision must be made, and if the parties
cannot agree about what it should be, then they cannot avoid resolving
the question of authority. We focus on this case for now.
2. Why Showdowns Occur
In our war example, Congress and the President disagree about
when the war should end and who should make the decision. Let us
suppose that they can both make reasonable constitutional arguments
and that the judiciary will not step in to resolve the dispute. What
happens next? If each branch asserts its power, we have a full-blown
constitutional crisis. No ordinary political or legal means exists for re-
solving the dispute. Consider how this crisis might play out. One pos-
sibility is that Congress enacts a law declaring the war at an end, and
the President directs the military to disobey the law. The military
would need to decide whether to obey the President or Congress.
The military might make this decision on the basis of a good-faith le-
gal analysis, or it might not. Whether or not it does, there is a further
question of whether soldiers would obey the decisions of the generals
and whether the public would support the decisions of the soldiers.
The soldiers might fear that if the generals take an unlawful stance,
the soldiers might subsequently be found guilty of committing crimes.
And even if they do not, they might fear that the public might fault
them for obeying (or disobeying) the generals. A great deal of delay
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and paralysis could result as people decide for themselves what they
ought to do. But eventually only two outcomes are possible. One is
that the nation divides into factions and a civil war erupts-a real pos-
sibility in many countries, but one sufficiently remote in the United
States today that we can safely ignore it. The other is that, through
the mysterious process by which public opinion forms, the public will
throw its weight behind one branch or the other, and the branch that
receives public support will prevail.
We will call the public's decision about the location of constitu-
tional authority "public constitutional sentiment." The "public" here
does not necessarily mean a fair aggregation of the views of all citi-
zens; it is a stand-in for the complex process by which the views of el-
ites, interest groups, ordinary citizens, and others ultimately deter-
mine the de facto lines of political authority-views that might be
mediated, or not, by good-faith interpretation of relevant texts and
traditions. Nor does "the public" refer to an episodic or superficial
political fancy, such as what can be read off a public opinion poll. If a
showdown occurs and the government is paralyzed, then the public,
or at least important groups, will rouse themselves to attention, and so
the view that prevails will reflect more fundamental, quasi-
constitutional instincts than the views that prevail in ordinary politics.
We will generally assume that public constitutional sentiment is ex-
ogenous-determined by social and economic trends and thus not di-
rectly controlled by political agents-but it is possible that public con-
stitutional sentiment is also influenced by earlier constitutional
showdowns and settlements, given the powerful role of tradition and
precedent in public thinking.
Public constitutional sentiment is the bedrock, but that does not
mean that it will be profound or even intelligent. There is no reason
to believe that public constitutional sentiment actually reflects the op-
timal allocation of authority: it may be that public constitutional sen-
timent is simply uninformed, or is heavily influenced by the private in-
terests of groups or elites. It might be that social welfare is maximized
if Congress has the authority to terminate the war, but public constitu-
tional sentiment nonetheless places that authority with the President.
Our focus is not on whether public constitutional sentiment is optimal
but what, given that sentiment, is the optimal way for Congress and the
President to act. We will bracket the possibility that Congress and the
President may care sufficiently about the public interest to cooperate in
allocating powers and avoid impasses that would be resolved by public
constitutional sentiment, while still knowing that public constitutional
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sentiment is uninformed and bad for the country. This possibility is not
absurd: it is reflected in the views of people who oppose proposals for
constitutional conventions because of the risk that the Constitution that
emerges would be worse than the Constitution that we have. However,
if Congress and the President can maintain such an allocation of pow-
ers voluntarily, then, by definition, showdowns do not occur. Thus, we
can ignore this possibility for purposes of our discussion.
If public constitutional sentiment will ultimately settle the ques-
tion of whether Congress or the President has the power to terminate
the war, why do showdowns occur? One might think that Congress
and the President will simply resolve their dispute by consulting public
constitutional sentiment. The alternative would only be a showdown
that would last long enough to rouse the public, and the paralysis of
government during this interval could damage both the President and
Congress and ruin the electoral chances of their occupants.
The question is a familiar one in the game theoretic literature on
bargaining, and we adopt that literature's findings. 4° Game theorists
would treat the problem in the context of a standard bargaining game
between two agents over a pool of resources or a "pie" whose value
declines over time as the agents haggle. When two agents bargain
over an asset, the eventual outcome is determined by the parties'
valuations of the asset, their relative bargaining power, and the degree
of information asymmetry.
Generally speaking, the asset will end up in the hands of the party
who values it more. If a seller owns an asset and a buyer values the as-
set more than the seller does, then a sale will occur and, all else equal,
they will split the surplus-the price will be midway between the
seller's valuation and the buyer's valuation. If another buyer offers
the seller a price higher than the seller's valuation but lower than the
first buyer's valuation, then the seller now has an outside option that
improves her bargaining position vis-A-vis the first buyer, and hence
the agreed-upon price will rise. The price will also reflect inside op-
tions, such as the value that the seller receives from using the asset
while bargaining proceeds.
Bargaining power refers to the relative time preferences of the
agents. If bargaining is likely to take a great deal of time and the seller
values future payoffs more than the original buyer does, the seller will
be able to hold out for a still higher price. The reason is that the seller
40 See generally ABHINAY MuTHOO, BARGAINING THEORY WITH APPLICATIONS (1999).
We simplify considerably.
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loses less than the buyer as a result of delay caused by a bargaining im-
passe, and so the buyer will pay a higher price to avoid the delay.
Information asymmetry exists when one or both agents lack in-
formation about the valuation of the other. Information asymmetry is
always a matter of degree. At one extreme, in a purely theoretical
world where information asymmetry does not exist, the agents would
come to an agreement in the first round of bargaining because they
can only become worse off from delay. As the degree of information
asymmetry increases, however, agents might gain an advantage from
delay. For example, suppose that the seller does not know whether
the buyer values the asset a great deal or very little. If a great deal, the
seller would charge a high price; if very little, the seller would charge a
low price. Not knowing which buyer she faces, the seller might offer a
high price. The high-value buyer would accept the price in order to
avoid the cost of delay, while the low-value buyer would hold out an
extra round. In the second round, the seller knows that only the low-
value buyer would have turned down the initial offer and, accordingly,
lowers the price. Thus, in equilibrium, delay and the resulting loss of
value of the asset occurs with some probability.
The "asset" in our example is the right to determine when the war
will be terminated. Congress and the President may value this asset to
a different degree, simply because the relevant officials' electoral
prospects depend to a different degree on the outcome of the war.
One source of asymmetric information, then, arises from uncertainty
that each agent may have about the other agent's valuation of the
right.4' Another source of asymmetric information arises from uncer-
tainty about public constitutional sentiment, and each agent might
have different views about the probability that public constitutional
sentiment will favor its claim. If the President announces that he will
refuse to obey a statute that terminates the war, even if the govern-
ment will collapse, he is making a strong statement that he values the
right to terminate the war a great deal. This statement may or may
not be credible; all of this depends on how much Congress knows
about the President's incentives. But if the President really does value
the right a great deal, and Congress does not believe him, then a long
time will pass before a resolution is achieved.
It should be immediately clear that a showdown is a matter of de-
gree. After Congress passes the law declaring the end of the war, the
41 The institutions are aggregations, of course, which complicates this argument;
we address this issue in Part III.C, infra.
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executive branch might engage in some tentative actions designed to
gauge public constitutional sentiment. It might begin by expressing
some reservations about Congress's authority or leaking unofficial
statements of disagreement. If the public responds favorably, the ex-
ecutive might take a strong stance, and, correlatively, Congress might
back off. If the public's views are ambiguous, both sides might dig in
their heels. In the meantime, the military might temporize, hoping
for a political resolution. As time passes, the fact of an impasse will
become clear, the cost from delay will increase, and an atmosphere of
crisis may develop. At some point, one side or the other will back
down, a compromise will be achieved, or there will be a breakdown in
authority, such as civil war.
The agent that prevails gains two benefits. First, its policy view will
prevail. The war will or will not be terminated. Second, its authority
over the policy domain will be established in the following sense.
When the issue arises again in the future-in some future war, where
the President and Congress have different views as to the timing of
withdrawal-the institution that made the decision earlier will have
presumptive authority to make the decision the second time. The
reason is that the first decision will establish that public constitutional
sentiment confers authority on that agent. If the President prevails
the first time around, then Congress will fear that resisting the Presi-
dent the second time will lead to defeat yet again. To be sure, public
constitutional sentiment could shift in the intervening period, but this
is only a possibility, and if general political conditions do not change
in the meantime, then it is unlikely that public constitutional senti-
ment will either. Adding to this, the precedent itself might feed into
and strengthen public constitutional sentiment, as people generally
give weight to tradition and precedent, and the agent who resists the
precedent might be faulted for carelessly provoking a crisis.
4
2
Our picture, then, depicts political agents being tempted to ad-
vance their authority at the expense of other agents, while also fearing
that if the other side does not back down, a politically damaging im-
passe or crisis could occur. Such a crisis would hurt both sides that
participate in it, weakening them relative to other agents that stay on
42 In imaginable cases, an agent will lose the policy battle but win the authority
battle. For example, a President might strike a deal with Congress that provides that
the President will change policy and Congress will, by some explicit act, recognize the
President's authority. But this is not really a case of constitutional change through a
showdown; it is a kind of incremental constitutional evolution that occurs through
normal politics.
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the sidelines, but one side will emerge with public constitutional sen-
timent on its side and thus do better than the other side. To avoid
showdowns, the agents attempt to predict public constitutional senti-
ment and reach a bargain, but they sometimes fail. Part II will exam-
ine constitutional showdowns from the demand side, asking what rate
and distribution of showdowns would be best from the standpoint of
social welfare. Part III will turn to the supply side, asking whether na-
tional lawmaking institutions will produce or approximate the optimal
level and distribution of showdowns. We attempt throughout to state
the conditions under which showdowns are welfare improving and the
conditions under which decentralized interaction among branches
will or will not produce welfare-improving showdowns.
II. NORMATIVE EVALUATION
Often the struggle to establish constitutional authority overshad-
ows the decision itself. Showdowns are played for high stakes, and if
the benefits are great, the risks are great as well. If both agents take
an aggressive stance, then a showdown occurs, and rather than estab-
lishing policy and seeing its choice vindicated, each agent finds itself
in a costly and protracted battle to assert its authority. The delay and
crisis that result can seriously harm the public interest. In Part III, we
will discuss how agents' incentives to make these tradeoffs might cause
a deviation from the socially optimal outcome. In this Part, we want to
establish what that socially optimal outcome is.
A. Social Costs and Benefits
In the framework on which we have been relying, what are the so-
cial costs and benefits of showdowns? The benefit is that a showdown
clarifies constitutional authority, reducing decision costs for the gov-
ernment and public in the future. The cost is that a showdown inter-
rupts governance. The social desirability of a particular showdown
depends on the balance of this benefit and cost.
Clarification of constitutional authority provides major benefits to
the public. When public officials do not know who has the authority
to perform some action, they make inconsistent decisions or fail to
decide, leaving subordinates uncertain how to proceed and the public
confused about law and policy. The public, unable to predict how the
government will act, is likely to be excessively cautious. Future gen-
erations and current actors-officials, citizens, and litigants-benefit
from clarification of the rules of the constitutional game, all else
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equal. Obviously an actor might prefer uncertainty to clearly bad
rules, but only if the uncertainty creates a chance that the rules will
eventually be clarified in the actor's favor. At any given level of (ex-
pected) goodness or badness of the rules, clarity is better than lack of
clarity. Furthermore, a risk-averse actor might prefer a clear rule that
is somewhat unfavorable, if an ambiguous rule with a more favorable
expected outcome carries with it a risk of severe downside loss. And two
risk-averse parties may both prefer a compromise that clearly gives
them only half a loaf, if there is a chance that uncertainty will eventu-
ally be resolved by giving the other party the whole loaf.
Uncertainty is bad to the extent that actors do not like to bear
risk, but another problem with uncertainty is that it creates unneces-
sary transaction costs. In area after area of constitutional law, the
precedents, judicial and nonjudicial, created by earlier showdowns are
picked over by commentators and the actors involved; but there are
relatively few precedents, so they leave open most of the fighting is-
sues, and the resulting debates are interminable and socially fruitless.
The only way for the government to act when officials disagree about
their authority is through constant negotiation and renegotiation, so
officials can trade off favored areas of authority or find common
ground where one can act without undermining the goals of the
other. An early showdown can reduce this costly wheel-spinning in fu-
ture generations.
The cost of a showdown is simply that the government does not
act-or, more precisely, that the energy of government officials is di-
verted from the problem at hand to the problem of asserting authority
(in the case of top officials) or the problem of ascertaining the lines of
authority (in the case of subordinate officials). Top officials stop ar-
guing about whether the war should be terminated-a question in-
volving difficult judgments about troop strength, home-front morale,
and so forth-and start arguing about who should have the authority
to terminate the war-a question involving difficult judgments about
relative institutional advantage in conducting wars. Subordinate offi-
cials, like generals and soldiers, must make predictions about how the
argument between top officials will be resolved. If they guess wrong,
they could find themselves in trouble for disobeying the institution
that ends up winning the showdown, or, if they temporize, failing to
be prepared when the decision is made. Subordinate officials might
end up acting excessively cautiously, so as to avoid offending the dif-
ferent authorities, or allowing policy and military judgments to be in-
fluenced by their implications for the resolution of the conflict about
20081
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authority, to the extent that subordinate officials have preferences re-
garding such resolution. And a showdown over one issue, like execu-
tive privilege, might metastasize, as each side refuses to cooperate in
other policy dimensions (appointments, budgets, and other areas of
substantive legislation) until the other side backs down with respect to
the original source of dispute.
Closely bound up with these considerations is that of timing. Of-
ten showdowns should be avoided today because they may produce
41future benefits that are not as great as they might first appear.
There are two advantages from delaying a showdown to the future.
First, the particular problem that gives rise to the impasse today might
not recur, or might recur only with low probability. If so, the costly
shutdown of the government today will turn out to generate a low ex-
pected benefit in the future. Second, a resolution today might be er-
roneous (as judged by the public sentiment of future generations),
whereas the particular problem that gives rise to the impasse today
might be better understood in the future. Another set of wars might
teach the public the advantages and disadvantages of giving the ter-
mination authority to the President or Congress; if so, then it might
be better to put off establishing the rule until this information has
been obtained. This scenario assumes, as always, that the information
influences public constitutional sentiment, for a rule once established
might be difficult to change. In sum, avoiding a showdown today has
an option value equal to the benefit from obtaining additional infor-
mation before making an irreversible or difficult-to-change settlement
that might be erroneous.
To understand these points, consider two examples. First, to con-
tinue with our war example, let us further assume that everyone
agrees that the United States will continue to enter new wars, rou-
tinely, far into the future. Second, consider the Bush/Gore electoral
dispute, which occurred because of an unusual confluence of factors
that resulted in ambiguity about which candidate had won a single
state whose electoral votes were decisive for the election. Imagine that
such an outcome is a once-in-a-century event.
It seems clear that resolving the question of war-termination au-
thority is more important for the future than resolving the question of
who has the authority to declare the victor in a presidential campaign
43 This is a point about option value. See AVINASH K. DIXIT & ROBERT S. PINDYCK,
INVESTMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY 135-74 (1994) (outlining formal methods of option
valuation).
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that turns on a single state's electoral votes, where the popular vote is
so close that minor voting irregularities obscure the outcome. This is
not because terminating wars is more important than resolving con-
tested elections. The importance of the policy outcome could be the
same as far as we are concerned. The reason that resolving the ques-
tion of war-termination authority is more important is just that this
question will arise many times in the near future. Thus, the short-
term cost of failing to resolve that question without delay for the war
today could well be lower than the long-term benefit of having an an-
swer ready when that question arises repeatedly over the next twenty44
years. By contrast, the short-term cost of failing to resolve the election
without delay today may well be higher than the long-term benefit of
failing to resolve similar electoral disputes in the future, simply because
the likelihood of similar electoral disputes is so small. The relative im-
portance of the issue is not a factor, because it appears both on the cost
side of the equation and on the benefit side of the equation.
Another relevant factor is how much the interests of future gen-
erations should be weighted. At one (implausible) extreme, one
might think that the interest of future generations should be ignored,
in which case showdowns should always be avoided because the bene-
fits accrue only to the future. A more plausible position is that the in-
terests of future generations deserve the same weight as those of the
present, in which case showdowns will generally have great value. We
take no position in this debate.45  Our argument is only that the
greater the proper weight for the interests of future generations, the
greater the value of showdowns today.
In sum, the optimal outcome can be described in the following
way. Suppose that an agent asserts control over a policy area. An-
other agent should acquiesce if it believes the first agent does in fact
have that authority, rooted in public constitutional sentiment. If it
does not believe the first agent has such authority, then it should ac-
quiesce only if it believes the long-term gains from a showdown that
leads to a clarification of constitutional authority are less than the
short-term costs from delay, including the diversion of government re-
sources and the lost option value that results from a premature and
possibly erroneous decision that does not exploit future information
44 Cutting in the other direction, if wars occur more frequently, then the govern-
ment and the public can learn more about them by putting off the showdown.
45 For various views on intergenerational equity, see the essays collected in DIS-
COUNTING AND INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY (Paul R. Portney & John P. Weyant eds.,
1999).
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or that freezes authority despite changing circumstances. Otherwise,
the agent should assert its authority and provoke such a showdown.
This tradeoff will work in favor of causing constitutional conflict
when future payoffs are discounted only a little, the particular policy
question is likely to recur with high frequency, and little in the way of
new information can be expected to arise in the future. A counterin-
tuitive implication of this argument is that a well-run government, one
that takes account of the interests of future generations, will find itself
in more constitutional conflicts than a poorly run government, hold-
ing constant the clarity and completeness of the dejure constitution.
We must also compare the costs and benefits of showdowns with
the costs and benefits of alternative means for clarifying the constitu-
tional rules. Showdowns are compressed dramas that occupy the
foreground, but in the background is the ordinary slow development
of the constitutional order, in which small disagreements, conces-
sions, and adjustments accumulate over time to settle the distribution
of powers. If these incremental processes produce an optimal level of
constitutional clarity, constitutional showdowns might be all cost and
no benefit, and the optimal number of showdowns might be zero.
However, there are some constitutional clarifications that cannot
even in principle be produced by small steps; rather, they require
sharp breaks with the past. The ultimate constitutional showdown,
the Civil War, could not have been replicated by small steps within the
preexisting constitutional order; the very point was to settle what that
order would be. Likewise, there can be no incremental analogue of
the New Deal Court-packing episode, which was by its nature a dis-
crete attempt to change the very structure of the Court all at once,
rather than simply to influence its members' preferences through a
gradual series ofjudicial appointments over time (a strategy that Roo-
sevelt also pursued, with far greater success).
This point is often made in the context of evolutionary decision
making. Incremental steps are easier than top-down planning, but
they can only take one up to a local maximum, which, in any reasona-
46
bly complex environment, is unlikely to be the global maximum.
The antebellum period was one of incremental compromises that led
to a constitutional settlement that, at least in the eyes of the North,
was far below a global maximum that could not be reached through a
further small step. Other possible examples are easy to think of. The
executive branch has become powerful through a large number of in-
46 See, e.g., JORGEN W. WEIBULL, EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY 55-58 (1995).
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cremental steps stretching back two centuries. These steps have led to
what some people believe is an excessive concentration of power in
the hands of the President.47 Whether this belief is correct or not, this
type of gradual evolution could not have achieved what is arguably the
global peak of executive power-the type of parliamentary system en-
joyed by the United Kingdom. This type of change would have re-
quired an abrupt switch to an entirely different system.
Furthermore, even where incremental processes are a possible
substitute for showdowns, and even where the two mechanisms pro-
duce the same eventual level of constitutional clarity, they have a dif-
ferent cost-benefit mix. Incremental processes reduce the direct costs
of conflict in the current period-no large-scale political battles are
required-and allow a mid-course correction if circumstances change
or new information emerges, but they also stretch out low-level con-
flict over time, with higher interim uncertainty. The same variables
we have mentioned determine the conditions under which one proc-
ess or the other will prove superior: where a clarifying conflict in the
current period would be very costly and might produce an erroneous
outcome, where the costs of interim uncertainty are low, and where
the benefits of keeping options open over time are high, incremental
processes should be preferred, but not if conditions are the reverse.
Sometimes one set of conditions will hold, sometimes the other. In
general, there is no reason to think that incremental processes will al-
ways be superior, or that the optimal level of showdowns is indeed zero.
B. The Problem of Ambiguous Acquiescence
In many historical cases, Congress and the President agree about
the policy outcome but disagree about lines of authority. For exam-
ple, suppose that the executive branch has made a controversial deci-
sion, and a suspicious Congress wants the relevant executive officials
to testify about their role in that decision. The President believes that
Congress has no right to compel the officials to testify, whereas Con-
gress believes that it has such a right. However, the President, in fact,
does not mind if the officials testify because he believes that their tes-
timony will reveal that the decision was made in good faith and for
good reasons.
47 See, e.g., LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 37-65 (1972)
(discussing the expansion of presidential power through the lens of relations with
other nations).
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The President's problem is that, if he allows the officials to testify,
Congress and the public might interpret his acquiescence as recogni-
tion that Congress has the power to force executive officials to testify.
If he refuses to allow the officials to testify, then he preserves his claim
of executive privilege but loses the opportunity to show that the deci-
sion was made in good faith. In addition, he risks provoking a consti-
tutional impasse in which Congress could eventually prevail-if, as we
have discussed, public constitutional sentiment turns out to reject ex-
ecutive privilege in these circumstances. Congress faces similar di-
lemmas, for example, when it approves of officials nominated by the
President for an agency or commission but wants to assert the power
in general to impose restrictions on appointments.
Political agents have long relied on a middle way to avoid the two
extremes of acquiescence, on the one hand, and impasse, on the other.
They acquiesce in the decision made by the other agent while claiming
that their acquiescence does not establish a precedent. Or, equiva-
lently, they argue that their acquiescence was a matter of comity rather
than submission to authority. Are such claims credible? Can one avoid
the precedential effect of an action by declaring that it does not estab-
lish a precedent-in effect, engaging in "ambiguous acquiescence"?
The answer to this question is affirmative as long as the alternative
explanation for the action is in fact credible. If, for example, observ-
ers agree that the President benefits from the testimony of executive
officials, then his acquiescence to a congressional subpoena has two
equally plausible explanations: that he independently benefits from
the testimony, or that he believes that public constitutional sentiment
rejects executive privilege. The response is thus ambiguous, and
Congress may be no wiser about what will happen in the future when
the President does not wish to permit officials to testify because their
testimony would harm him or executive branch processes. If so, the
ambiguous nature of the action does not establish a focal point that
avoids an impasse in the future.
On the other hand, if the President's claim that he benefits from
the testimony is obviously false, then his authority will be accordingly
diminished. This is why ambiguous acquiescence is not a credible
strategy when the President and Congress disagree about the policy
outcome. If the President thinks the war should continue, Congress
thinks the war should end, and the President acquiesces to a statute
that terminates the war, then he can hardly argue that he is acting out
of comity. He could only be acting because he lacks power. But an
agent can lack authority in more complicated settings where no seri-
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ous policy conflict exists. If the President makes officials available for
testimony every time Congress asks for such testimony, and if the tes-
timony usually or always damages the President, then his claim to be
acting out of comity rather than lack of authority eventually loses its
credibility. Repeated ambiguous acquiescence to repeated claims over
time will eventually be taken as unambiguous acquiescence and hence a
loss of authority. For this reason, a President who cares about maintain-
ing his constitutional powers will need to refuse to allow people to tes-
tify even when testimony would be in his short-term interest.
From a normative perspective, ambiguous acquiescence reflects a
midway point between the extremes of showdown and acquiescence
and reflects the same tradeoff. As we saw, agents should tolerate im-
passe when an issue is of great importance to the future and the cost
of present delay is relatively low, and they should avoid impasse in the
opposite case. Thus, ambiguous acquiescence is optimal in the mid-
dle case: when the issue is of moderate importance to the future and
the cost of present delay is moderate as well. It also bears reiterating
that ambiguous acquiescence is not always possible; when it is not,
then the choice must be acquiescence or confrontation.
C. The Analogy to Rules and Standards
Many arguments in legal theory are at bottom arguments about
rules and standards. Rules minimize decision costs because the deci-
sion maker needs to take account of only a few of the factors that are
relevant to the first-best resolution of the dispute, but by the same to-
ken they result in predictable error. If decision makers are highly
competent, standards avoid error because they permit all relevant fac-
tors to be considered, but they involve enormous decision costs. If
decision makers are of limited competence, the larger set of informa-
tion that the standard makes relevant can overload their capacities,
perhaps even inducing greater error than under a rule. The optimal
choice between rules and standards trades off decision and error costs
across contexts.4
Our argument reflects a second-order, temporal version of this
tradeoff. Constitutional showdowns convert standards into rules that
in turn reduce decision costs for future conflicts. A constitutional
standard allocates authority in an ambiguous fashion ("the public in-
48 See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J.
557 (1992) (weighing factors in the choice between rules and standards, focusing on
whether it is more efficient to allocate content-formation costs ex ante or ex post).
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terest" and the like) that leaves political actors and the public a great
deal of work in hashing out the actual allocation when a dispute over
authority arises. Agents can avoid establishing a precedent by agree-
ing early in the process to allow one agent to make the decision or
leave authority ambiguous if the agents can agree on a policy out-
come. The standard remains in place, and decision costs are thrown
onto the shoulders of future agents. However, if the agents instead
assert their opposing claims and force a showdown, then a rule may
emerge, one that saves decision costs in the future.
49
The second-order decision, whether to convert a standard into a
rule or allow the standard to remain in place, is akin to a decision to
make an investment. An investment involves a cost today, and a re-
turn in the future. The cost of the showdown is the interruption of
governance; the benefit is the reduced uncertainty for the future-the
transformation of a standard into a rule. When judges, legislators,
codifiers, restatement drafters, and others come up with rules, we
tend to congratulate them for simplifying decision making for future
agents. When they maintain standards, we criticize them for failing to
clarify the law. But the law should not always be clarified; much de-
pends on whether the law in question will govern many or few actions
in the future. At a constitutional level, the decision to have a clarify-
ing showdown or not reflects a similar calculus.
D. The Judiciary
So far we have focused on Congress and the executive, for the
sake of simplicity. Constitutional confrontations often involve the ju-
diciary as well, as in the examples noted in the introduction. Execu-
tivejudiciary impasses occur when the executive refuses to comply
with ajudicial order, as when Lincoln rejected Justice Taney's grant of
Merryman's writ of habeas corpus. Congress-judiciary impasses are
usually less dramatic because Congress lacks executive power, and if
the executive refuses to obey judicial orders, Congress can respond
only by confronting the executive, rather than the judiciary directly.
Still, in the background, Congress can threaten to deprive the judici-
49 See Cass R. Sunstein & Edna Ullmann-Margalit, Second-Order Decisions, 110 ETH-
ICS 5, 7 (1999) (defining second-order decisions as "decisions about the appropriate
strategy for reducing the problems associated with making a first-order decision").
50 ExparteMerryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 148 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487) (declaring
that Lincoln, in suspending habeas corpus, "exercised a power which he does not pos-
sess under the constitution").
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ary of funds and strip it ofjurisdiction, and this threat could lead to an
impasse if the judiciary attempted to defy it.
The academic literature on constitutional conflicts involving the
judiciary has focused on the "passive virtues," in Alexander Bickel's
phrase. 5' Bickel believed that the judiciary should exercise the passive
virtues when the constitutional stakes are high, meaning that the judi-
ciary should dodge the issues by invoking doctrines of abstention and
procedural doctrines such as standing. Similarly, Cass Sunstein has
argued that judges should try to decide cases on narrow and shallow
grounds where possible. 2  If a dispute between the executive and
Congress requires either a decision about the meaning of a statute or
a decision about the branches' relative constitutional authority, the
judiciary should, if possible, decide on the former ground, so that the
constitutional question is put off; even if forced to decide the constitu-
tional question, judges should say no more than necessary to resolve
the case at hand and should not engage in unnecessarily ambitious
theorizing.
It is clear that these scholars advocate the middle way of ambigu-
ous acquiescence in these cases: acquiescence, because the court does
not dispute the constitutional claims of the other branches; ambigu-
ous, because the court does not adopt their claims either. Rather, the
largest claims are left open for the future. Constitutional precedents
on the merits of those claims are either nonexistent (under the pas-
sive virtues approach) or narrow and shallow (under Sunstein's mini-
malist approach).
As we have seen, however, ambiguous acquiescence is not always
possible and, even when possible, not always optimal. 3 Ambiguous ac-
51 BICKEL, supra note 5, at 111.
52 See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON
THE SUPREME COURT (1999).
53 To be clear, neither Sunstein nor Bickel argues that courts should always refrain
from taking strong positions. Sunstein's decision-cost/error-cost framework makes
clear that the choice between minimalism (here, ambiguous acquiescence) and maxi-
malism (here, a clarifying showdown) depends on the short-term costs and long-term
benefits of each. Id. at 46-50. We attempt to clarify the social costs and benefits and
examine whether institutions will supply the socially optimal rate of showdowns. We
also note that many of the virtues of minimalism that Sunstein identifies are confined
to judicial minimalism, and do not apply to ambiguous acquiescence as between the
other branches. To take just one example, Sunstein believes that judicial minimalism
can, in some circumstances, promote democracy by leaving most policy judgments to
elected officials; as between the President and legislators, all of whom are elected, de-
mocratic values do not, in a general sense, favor either acquiescence or mutual asser-
tion. Along this dimension, the case for judicial minimalism is much stronger than the
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quiescence is possible only when the agent's alternative explanation for
its acquiescence is credible. In the case of the judiciary, consider the
use of the standing doctrine to avoid resolving conflicts between Con-
gress and the executive. If the judiciary repeatedly uses the standing
doctrine in this way, and manipulates it so as to avoid resolving cases
even when the standing doctrine would ordinarily not present a barrier,
then observers will infer that the judiciary simply is unwilling to assert
constitutional authority over the dispute at hand. Over time, acquies-
cence will become less ambiguous and, eventually, unambiguous. This
is, in fact, what has happened for a wide array of interbranch conflicts.
For example, the judiciary has refused to hear on the merits cases
in which members of Congress have sought to prevent the President
from sending troops abroad without complying with the War Powers
Resolution. The courts have not held that the War Powers Resolution
is unconstitutional; instead, they have avoided the merits by invoking
doctrines of justiciability.5 4 So while the constitutionality of the War
Powers Resolution remains unresolved, the practical effect of the judi-
ciary's decisions is to allow the President to ignore it. The judiciary's
acquiescence was at one time ambiguous because the early cases left
open the possibility that the resolution would be struck down once
someone had standing. As additional cases have been brought, and
the judiciary has continued to find reasons to avoid deciding the mer-
its, this ambiguity has nearly disappeared.
Even when ambiguous acquiescence is credible, it is not always op-
timal. As we saw, ambiguous acquiescence is an optimal strategy only
in certain circumstances: namely, when the cost of present delay and
the benefit of future clarity are moderate. Consider, as an example, a
case in which the judiciary believes that executive actions during a war
violate constitutional rights of citizens but fears that if it tries to stop
the executive, the executive will defy it, provoking a constitutional cri-
sis. Still, such an impasse will be desirable if it is predictable that in
the present the cost of delay is not too high, and in the future the is-
sue is likely to recur. This might be more plausible today, where some
argument in favor of the political branches avoiding showdowns with each other. But
cf Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 317 (2000) (suggest-
ing that Congress has superior democratic credentials to the executive such that courts
concerned to promote democracy should require express congressional resolution of
major issues, especially those touching on constitutional rights).
See the various opinions in Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 20-22, 24, 28 (D.C.
Cir. 2000), denying legislators standing to seek judicial remedy where political options
were available, albeit unsuccessful, and in concurring opinions arguing that the claims
are notjusticiable and moot.
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fear that the war on terror will extend indefinitely into the future,
than during the Civil War, when the war seemed like an interruption
of normal politics. 55 So it may not be surprising that courts are more
willing to challenge the executive branch today than in the past. We
should interpret this unprecedented level ofjudicial activity as reflect-
ing an attempt to plumb public constitutional sentiment, even at some
risk to the short-term functioning of the government, since a clearer
sense of public sentiment might be necessary in order to support a
long-term constriction of civil liberties.
E. A Note on Aggrandizement
Some people argue that uncertainty about the constitutional alloca-
tion of powers deters aggrandizement, making institutions cautious
about pressing the limits of their power. They further argue that show-
downs should be discouraged because the clarification of powers that
occurs after a showdown will have negative rather than positive conse-
quences. Namely, with the uncertainty eliminated, institutions will
press the limits of their power, and the public will suffer as a result.5
6
The argument is hard to criticize because so many of its elements
are poorly articulated. 57 An institution that presses the limits of its
5 We do not actually think this common claim makes sense; it rests on a confusion
between foresight and hindsight. See ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN
THE BALANCE: SECURITY, LIBERTY, AND THE COURTS 255 (2007) (recalling theories that
World War II might not have a conventional ending, and drawing analogies to the "na-
tional struggle[s] to defeat polio, or the Mafia, or the Ku Klux Klan," in which victory
occurred despite the inability to define victory or date it precisely).
We have not found a detailed defense of this view; however, it is clearly a part of
legal-academic folkways. For brief gestures in this direction, see JOHN YOO, THE POW-
ERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11, at 11-
12 (2005) ("In the area of foreign affairs, the Constitution does not establish a strict,
legalized process for decision making. Instead, it establishes a flexible system permit-
ting a variety of procedures. This not only gives the nation more flexibility in reaching
foreign affairs decisions, it gives each of the three branches of government the ability to check the
initiatives of the others in foreign affairs." (emphasis added)); Bruce Ackerman, The Emer-
gency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029, 1042 (2004) ("During normal times, the common
law fog allows judges and other legal sages to regale themselves with remarkably astrin-
gent commentaries on the use of emergency powers, cautioning all and sundry that
they are unconstitutional except under the most extreme circumstances. This creates a
cloud of suspicion and restrains officials who might otherwise resort to emergency powers too
lightly." (emphasis added)).
"' For example, the argument seems to assume that the institutions are risk averse.
Risk-neutral institutions would not treat an ambiguous rule as anything but a point
along a probability distribution, and would discount the benefits and costs of various
courses of action accordingly. However, when we relax the assumption of personified
branches in Part III, we will see that it is problematic to ascribe risk aversion to an insti-
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power might do well or poorly for the public, and whether it does de-
pends on various factors. We might think that the judiciary ought to
press the limits of its power in order to protect civil liberties against a
despotic government, but not to substitute its policy judgment for that
of Congress. We might think that the executive should press the limits
of its power to counter an existential threat or a Great Depression, but
not to engage in ordinary law enforcement activities. Since institutions
share power, whether one institution should press the limits of its power
depends to a great extent on whether other institutions are misusing
their powers. It is hard to see how ambiguity about the contours of au-
thority could be desirable in the abstract; its effect is just to create un-
certainty among citizens who are regulated by the various institutions.
All else equal, uncertainty is a systemic cost, which can only be justified
on second-best grounds; what those grounds might be is obscure.
Indeed, political scientists commonly argue that clear allocations
of authority are essential to constitutional stability. Barry Weingast,
for example, argues that in stable constitutional systems governments
refrain from crossing constitutional boundaries because they fear that
multiple groups will oppose them if they do so. In Weingast's model,
a single group does not have the power to prevent government ex-
cesses, but if groups coordinate, then they can, in tandem, resist the
government." In the absence of rules that describe the limits of gov-
ernment action, the groups lack a focal point that can provide the ba-
sis for coordination, and the government can suppress them through
a divide and conquer strategy.5 9 Governmental violation of a clear al-
location of power can trigger general resistance because the stipulated
allocation serves as a focal point for resistance. 60 Creeping aggran-
dizement is more, not less, likely when the constitutional allocation of
powers is ill defined.
tution such as the presidency, Congress, or the judiciary. The President might well
believe that risk taking is the best chance for obtaining electoral returns, and members
of Congress might have similar views. Politicians are disciplined by parties, and party
leaders might believe that party members best help the party by taking risks and might
thus be willing to subsidize those who take risks and fail.
See Barry R. Weingast, Self-Enforcing Constitutions 3 (Nov. 2005) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://polisci.stanford.edu/faculty/documents/weingast-self-
enforcing%20constitutions.pdf; see alsoJames D. Fearon, Self-Enforcing Democracy 13
(Aug. 24, 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.stanford.edu/
-jfeason/papers/sedapsaO6.pdf (applying Weingast's model to elections).
59 Weingast, supra note 58, at 3-4.
60 Id. at 22.
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In sum, the argument that ambiguous constitutional norms deter
governments or parts of government from engaging in self-
aggrandizing behavior is implausible. The argument lacks an account
of the interests and capacities of the relevant agents, and so is hardly
more than a surmise. At the same time, there are several independent
reasons for thinking that institutional self-aggrandizement is deterred
by clear rather than ambiguous rules.
III. THE SUPPLY OF CONSTITUTIONAL SHOWDOWNS
Given the social costs and benefits of showdowns, we have argued,
there is some socially optimal rate, timing, and scale of showdowns. It
is hard to say anything precise about these factors in the abstract, but
we have sketched the critical variables and the conditions under which
social welfare is increased or decreased by showdowns. In this Part we
turn from the demand side to the supply side, from the social calculus
to the private calculus of institutions. We use "private" not in its col-
loquial sense, but as shorthand for the decentralized decisions of
branches in a separation of powers system as opposed to the decisions
of a benevolent social planner.
Even without a precise account of the socially optimal rate, timing,
and scale of constitutional showdowns, we can say something about
the supply side. We will argue that there is no general reason to think
that the interaction of lawmaking institutions produces socially opti-
mal showdowns. Section A suggests that the private calculus predicta-
bly diverges from the social calculus. Section B denies that there is
any invisible-hand mechanism that causes the decentralized decisions
of institutions to approximate the social optimum. Section C relaxes
the assumption that each branch is a unitary actor, but argues that re-
laxing the assumption generally has no effect on our conclusions, and
in some cases may even strengthen them. We also consider the role of
political parties, with the same conclusion. Section D provides illus-
trations of the divergence between private and social costs.
A. The Private Calculus
Showdowns occur when one branch confronts another over a con-
stitutional issue. But when will such confrontations occur? As we dis-
cussed in Part I, showdowns occur when public constitutional senti-
ment regarding the location of authority over some policy area is
uncertain, and each side believes that if it asserts its own authority, the
other side will blink.
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Game theory aficionados will draw the analogy to the Chicken
Game, in which each player receives the highest payoff if it confronts
while the other player avoids, but in which mutual confrontation pro-
duces the worst outcome for both players. For a nonconstitutional
example, the government shutdowns of 1994 and 1995 resembled a
Chicken Game in which neither Clinton nor Gingrich blinked until it
was too late; for a constitutional example, the McCardle episode re-
sembled a game in which the Republican Congress drove straight
while the Court swerved. Our version is a little more complicated, in-
volving both asymmetric information and a continuum of choices, for
which we draw on standard bargaining theory. 6' For our purposes, pre-
cisely which model best describes a given interaction or context is not
the main question; rather, we focus on the payoffs to individual players.
Institutions will decide whether to engage in showdowns by com-
paring the benefits and costs to themselves of doing so-specifically,
the "private" costs and benefits. What are the costs and benefits to in-
stitutions of engaging in showdowns? Here again, we assume that in-
stitutions can be treated as having a composite utility function-a
standard personifying assumption justified by the fact that every insti-
tution has internal rules for aggregating individual preferences into
institutional preferences, and an assumption that simplifies the pres-
entation. In Part III.C, we relax this assumption and examine cases in
which the interests of the individuals who staff institutions, and of po-
litical parties, diverge from the interests of the institutions themselves.
Both the benefits and the costs depend on what institutions maxi-
mize. Plausible maximands include power in various senses-including
the scope of the institution's legal authority, the ability to carry out a
preferred course of action, and the ability to force other institutions to
comply with a preferred course of action; popularity, or diffuse support
among the general public; and ideological satisfaction with policy. Dif-
61 See supra note 40 and accompanying text. Other interactions resemble a Pris-
oner's Dilemma, in which each player receives the highest payoff if it defects while the
other cooperates, and the lowest payoff if it cooperates, while the other defects; the
dominant strategy for both is to defect, and in a single-shot interaction both do so,
even though both would be better off if they could cooperate. On the other hand, co-
operation can be sustained in a repeat-play Prisoner's Dilemma, although it is only one
possible equilibrium. Still other interactions resemble a Battle of the Sexes, in which
both players prefer to coordinate on a common venture, yet each prefers that both coor-
dinate on a different common venture. These models of interaction are all at least par-
tially conflictual, although they mix cooperation and conflict. In the background are
many interactions in which branches have joint interests in cooperation without signifi-
cant distributive conflicts. However, pure coordination interactions are not as theoreti-
cally interesting as (partially) conflictual interactions, so we will focus on the latter.
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ferent institutions pursue different aims, with different weightings, at
different times. Benefits thus arise when a showdown expands an insti-
tution's power (somehow defined), increases its popularity or public
standing, or enables it to satisfy programmatic and policy goals. Costs
are the flip side of benefits: a showdown might diminish institutional
power, erode popularity, or frustrate policy aims.
Of course, there are severe conceptual and empirical difficulties
in specifying these costs and benefits more concretely. Happily, for
our purposes we need not offer a precise specification of all private
costs and benefits to institutions. Even without such a specification,
we can ask whether institutional decisions take into account all social
costs and benefits. The answer is no, even or especially if the players
manage to cooperate in a repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, or to avoid
disastrous crashes in a Chicken Game, and so on. In general, the de-
cision by any particular branch to confront another branch over a
constitutional question, or to avoid another's confrontation, will not
take into account all the social costs and benefits of showdowns. Con-
sider the following externalities-costs to third parties, including fu-
ture generations, that the players will systematically tend to ignore.
1. Governance Costs
Actors incur at least some of the costs of the showdown. If Congress
and the President seek to resolve the war in America's interests, and
disagree only on whether termination should be sooner or later, then a
showdown might indeed interfere with their overlapping goals. If the
two agents are arguing about lines of authority, they are not arguing
about the war, which means that they lose a valuable opportunity to
generate information and reach a mutually acceptable war strategy.
Suppose that Congress and the President agree that the war
should end in four months, but the President thinks that a token
force of 10,000 should stay behind and Congress believes that only
2000 should stay behind. Suppose further that a showdown delays the
eventual compromise of 6000 so that the original force remains for six
rather than four months. Both sides are hurt by the showdown be-
cause both preferred the early disengagement. The cost could be
ideological or electoral or both.
62 See generally Levinson, supra note 22 (discussing the aims of institutions and the
personnel who occupy them).
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The problem is that neither side fully internalizes the costs. If the
war goes on too long because the agents are arguing, the public might
be in no position to sanction the agents. If it punishes the Republican
President at the polls, it benefits the Democratic Congress; if it punishes
the Democratic Congress, it benefits the Republican President. Agents
will have excessive incentives to engage in showdowns, all else equal.
On the other hand, electoral incentives might operate in a differ-
ent fashion. Suppose that agents believe that the public will punish
incumbents if governance is interrupted, and vote in favor of chal-
lengers. To avoid this threat to their offices, elected officials might
implicitly agree to avoid showdowns even when they are, in the long
term, socially beneficial. In our example, the two-month delay might
be a cost-justified way to clarify who decides how to terminate a war.
But the agents avoid the delay because the actual governance costs are
exaggerated in their private calculus.
2. Certainty
Actors avoid confrontation when it is privately beneficial to do so,
even if conflict would create precedents that would benefit future
generations, all else equal, by clarifying the rules of the game. More
conflict now can mean lower transaction costs for several future gen-
erations; even with discounting, the latter benefit can exceed the for-
mer cost. In the recent controversy over the firing of U.S. Attorneys,
for example, commentators parsed the complex issues of executive
privilege with reference to one major Supreme Court case that is over
thirty years old and a few successor cases from the D.C. Circuit. 64
There is also some guidance from nonjudicial precedents; consider
the argument that Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has no consti-
tutional basis for refusing to testify before Congress about the decision
to invade Iraq, because Cabinet officials from previous administrations
testified in similar circumstances. 65 Still, such precedents are slightly
muddled by the fact that the executive and legislators often strike a
bargain whereby executive officials will testify, but will proclaim that
63 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
64 See, e.g., Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498
F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1974). For an overview of executive privilege, explaining the
many severe uncertainties in this area of law, see Posting of Cass R. Sunstein to the
University of Chicago Law School Faculty Blog, Executive Privilege: A Primer,
http://uchicagolaw.typepad.com/faculty/2OO7/O3/executive-privi.html#more (Mar.
26, 2007, 11:38 CST) (summarizing executive privilege in eight points).
65 Frank Rich, Is Condi Hiding the Smoking Gun?, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2007, § 4, at 15.
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they are doing so "voluntarily," rather than because Congress has con-
stitutional power to force them to do so. More seriously, in many
cases early bargains will head off a nascent conflict, resulting in no
precedent at all.
In general, current actors may have no incentive to take into ac-
count clarification benefits for third parties, especially for future gen-
erations. This means that future actors will incur transaction costs
coping with longstanding uncertainties that could have been deci-
sively clarified, one way or another, in a past constitutional show-
down-a showdown that never occurred because it was not in the in-
66terests of the then-dominant actors to engage in clarifying conflict.
3. Option Value and Unnecessary Precedents
On the other hand, future generations will often benefit from a
better precedent made later, with more information, rather than a
precedent made today, with less information. Delay would then be
desirable, from the social point of view, if more information can be
collected in the interim. A current showdown, even if it benefits cur-
rent actors, might create a premature precedent, freezing the consti-
tutional rules before the relevant considerations are well understood.
Collecting more information is especially likely to be useful in a
static environment, but delay is often desirable in a changing envi-
ronment as well, albeit for other reasons. A current issue that pro-
vokes severe conflict may simply disappear from the scene due to eco-
nomic, technological, or political change. Where this is so, social
resources spent on an authoritative resolution of the issue will be a
partial or total waste from the standpoint of future generations.
Where a showdown sets a precedent that would have been better
set later, with more information, or that need never have been set at
all, because the relevant issue soon disappears altogether, we will
speak of an unnecessary precedent. Let us define the precedential ef-
fect of a showdown as having two components: D, the direct prece-
dential benefit (the decision settles, for example, whether paper
66 This adapts a point made by Owen Fiss about settlement in litigation: the pri-
vate calculus of settlement fails to take into account the benefits to third parties of cre-
ating precedents. See Owen M. Fiss, Comment, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073,
1085 (1984). It is also a staple of the law and economics literature, though economists
tend to be less critical of settlement. See, e.g., Landes & Posner, supra note 4, at 261
(demonstrating that precedents can act as private, as well as public, goods); Shavell,
supra note 4, at 112-13 (concluding that settlement is always socially preferable to trial
but recognizing the social value of setting precedents).
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money is constitutional) and I, the indirect precedential benefit (the
decision establishes whether "due process" includes substantive fun-
damental rights 67). There is a cost C of generating the precedent,
which includes both the direct costs of decision making and political
conflict involved in generating the precedent, and also the cost that
arises from deciding the precedent now rather than later, with more
information.
An unnecessary precedent, then, is simply one where C > D + I. If
the value of waiting for more information is high, or if the showdown
that gives rise to the precedent involves costly political conflict, then C
will be high, and it will be better not to create a precedent now or at
all. If the precedent directly governs an issue that will soon disappear
and thus lacks significance to future generations, then D is low; unless
I is especially high, the precedent is likely to be unnecessary.
This is the social calculus, but the private calculus diverges. Cur-
rent actors will not take into account these benefits of delaying the
formation of precedents, and of pretermitting conflict over ephem-
eral issues. Just as current actors will avoid constitutional showdowns
altogether even if the clarification benefits would exceed the private
costs, by the same token they will engage in constitutional showdowns
now, rather than later or not at all, if it is to their advantage to do so.
These points emphasize that, from a social point of view that aggre-
gates (with appropriate discounting) the interests of current and fu-
ture generations, one must consider not only the number of show-
downs, but their distribution over time, relative to changes in political
and social problems.
4. Aggrandizement and the Checking Function
Suppose we have a theory stating that a separation of powers of
strength S is optimal, where S specifies the ratio of the power of each
branch of the national government to the total power of the national
government. 6s (If one branch has taken over the whole government,
67 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Note that the direct precedential
benefit of Griswold was low, because only a few other states banned the sale of contra-
ceptives, but its indirect precedential benefit was high. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
152-53 (1973) (relying on Griswold to conclude that the "right of privacy.., is broad
enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her preg-
nancy").
"' This theory might be legal, based on an account of the constitutional distribu-
tion of power, or it might instead be rooted in democratic theory or political morality.
For our purposes the source of the theory is irrelevant.
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S = 1 for the victorious branch and S = 0 for the others; if each of the
three branches is of equal strength, S = 0.33 for each. An S-function
might, for example, specify that the distribution of power should be
tPresident = 0.5, Congress = 0.25, and Supreme Court = 0.25). Obvi-
ously these are schematic, but are sufficient to illustrate our simple
point.) Suppose also that one institution-say, the presidency-is in-
creasing its strength such that its strength exceeds what is specified in
the social S-function. Then current citizens and future generations
will benefit from showdowns that check the expanding power of that
branch.
However, current institutions will be too passive-they will chal-
lenge the expanding institutions too rarely, and with too little inten-
sity-because they will not capture the benefits to future generations
of exercising the checking function. The largest harms from an un-
balanced government will be likely to materialize in the medium- and
long-term future, beyond the time horizon of current institutions.
Suppose, for discussion's sake, that one thinks the current power of
the Supreme Court is excessive-that the Court's S-factor is too high.
Then one might regret the many occasions in the past two genera-
tions on which Congress and the President have foregone opportuni-
ties to challenge the Court's power-including the many cases in
which the Court employed creative or disingenuous statutory inter-
pretation to protect its own jurisdiction, and the nonjudicial branches
then refused to force a constitutional showdown by clarifying the un-
derlying statutes.
The point that current checking will fail to internalize the inter-
ests of future generations would hold even if there were only two
branches in the picture. With three branches, however, externalities
among current actors are also possible. One possibility is that the
strongest branch-the one with the highest S-value-can play a divide-
and-conquer game, alternating alliances with the weaker branches un-
til it effectively dominates both. Here, the externality is that each of
the weaker branches fails to take into account the full costs of its
short-run opportunism to the other weak branch and to the balance
of the whole system. Conversely, the weaker branches will be tempted
to free-ride on each other's investment in checking the strongest
branch, so long as there is a positive cost to a showdown that checks
aggrandizement. A configuration (President = 0.5, Congress = 0.5,
Supreme Court = 0) might yield far more aggressive checking of
presidential expansion than would a configuration such as {President
= 0.5, Congress = 0.25, Supreme Court = 0.25). In the latter scenario
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Congress and the Court will face temptations to mutual free-riding,
while in the former scenario the concentration of nonpresidential
power in a single place reduces the scope for presidential aggran-
dizement.69
Obviously, many other scenarios are possible. We have assumed,
for example, that showdowns will help to check aggrandizement, but
this is not obviously true. Showdowns might actually provide the very
opportunity the stronger branch has been seeking to crush its adver-
saries or to clarify their impotence, creating a highly visible precedent
that will underscore its power. We mention these scenarios just to il-
lustrate the types of externalities, even with the current generation,
that can cause insufficient investments even in showdowns that would
check aggrandizement if they occurred. The divergence between pri-
vate and social costs and benefits will cause suboptimal checking, and
there is no reason to think the failure of institutions to invest in show-
downs that would promote optimal checking is somehow offset by
their private-regarding incentive to invest in showdowns that will pro-
mote their own power. There is no invisible-hand mechanism that
causes one type of failure to offset the other-a point to which we re-
turn below.
5. A Note on Representation-of the Present and the Future
Particular political mechanisms may cause some of these external-
ities to be internalized. Thus the interests of current citizens and liti-
gants will be partly taken into account by the more-or-less representa-
tive national institutions and the presidency and Congress, although a
large body of literature in public choice and political economy details
agency slack and other failures of representation that affect these in-
stitutions. The courts are less directly representative; although they
tend to follow the national election returns eventually, they do so only
with a time lag, and are used by outgoing political parties to entrench
their preferences against the incoming political tide.7 °
69 Potentially offsetting the free-rider problem is the multiplicity of checking
agents, which may raise the likelihood that at least one of them will step forward to
challenge an expansion of power. However, as we discuss shortly, there is no general
mechanism ensuring that one effect precisely compensates for the other.
70 See Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolu-
tion, 87 VA. L. REV. 1045, 1066-83 (2001) (observing that partisan entrenchment is the
"temporal extension of partisan representation"); Howard Gillman, How Political Parties
Can Use the Courts To Advance Their Agendas: Federal Courts in the United States, 1875-
1891, 96 AM. POL. Scl. REV. 511, 515-21 (2002) (concluding that the increased power
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However, current politics will not generally internalize the inter-
ests of future generations as such. Current voters will themselves care
about future generations, and this altruistic interest will then be re-
flected in the policies of current lawmakers (putting aside agency
slack between current lawmakers and current voters). This intergen-
erational altruism, although real, is plausibly seen as a weak force,
analogous to international altruism through foreign aid, on which de-
veloped democracies spend a tiny fraction of their resources. The fu-
ture is another country, 71 which means that current voters and their
agents in national lawmaking institutions will tend to subordinate the
interests of the future,just as they do the interests of other nations.
In principle, agency slack between current voters and current rep-
resentatives might actually offset the weakness of current voters' altru-
ism toward future generations. Current representatives who enjoy
loose political constraints might take it into their heads to crusade on
behalf of future generations. Or, more familiarly, they might use their
political freedom to enrich themselves, pursue current-regarding
rather than future-regarding ideological enterprises, and so on. In
general, there is no reason to think that any configuration of current
politics, whether low-slack or high-slack, will systematically internalize
future generations' interests, although it may look to the future in
episodic and unpredictable ways.
Our conclusion is not that the private calculus of the costs and
benefits of engaging in a showdown never tracks the social calculus,
aggregating the interests of succeeding generations over time. In par-
ticular cases, institutions may happen to engage in showdowns when
that would be desirable from a social perspective, or to avoid confron-
tation when that too would be socially desirable. The claim is that
there is no general mechanism aligning private institutional incentives
with the social optimum. Where institutional decisions happen to
track the optimum, it is a lucky coincidence; over a large set of cases,
wide divergences will predictably occur, and the divergences will be
strongly biased in favor of the interests of current generations.
and jurisdiction of federal courts from 1875 to 1891 was a result of Republican efforts
to entrench economic nationalism).
71 Eric A. Posner, Agencies Should Ignore Distant-Future Generations, 74 U. C-i. L. REV.
139, 142 (2007) (asserting that agencies treat future generations as they do the well-
being of foreigners, about whom voters care little).
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B. An Invisible Hand?
So far, we have suggested that there is no general reason to think
that the decentralized decisions of lawmaking branches and institu-
tions will result in socially optimal showdowns. It might be suggested
that decentralized decisions might result in socially optimal show-
downs by some sort of invisible-hand mechanism. Even if each institu-
tion considers only its private costs and benefits, rather than the social
costs and benefits, perhaps a kind of analogy to markets operates,
such that the social optimum arises as "the result of human action, but
not the execution of any human design."7  For similar or related sug-
gestions, consider the claims that the "fog" of legal uncertainty in con-
stitutional law has the systemically beneficial effect of deterring ag-
grandizement,73 or the suggestion that "[t] he governmental order that
arises in our system of separation of powers paradoxically has much in
common with the more spontaneous order that may arise where indi-
viduals work out mutually advantageous arrangements without the aid
of a central coordinator."7 4 The basic form of the argument is that
emergent constitutional norms, customs, conventions, and precedents
are or may be systemically optimal, even if no actor aims to promote
an optimal system.
Of course this is possible, but there is no reason to think that it ac-
tually is so. In general, these are methodologically suspect functional
explanations;75 they speculate that private decisions produce social
benefits without specifying how exactly this occurs. For a genuine in-
visible-hand process to operate, there must be some mechanism that
explains the connection between individual-level behavior and the sys-
temic optimum.16 Absent intentional optimizing by a social planner,
the social optimum will be produced only by some sort of evolutionary
or feedback mechanism.
72 ADAM FERGUSON, AN ESSAY ON THE HISTORY OF CIVIL SOCIETY 119 (Fania Oz-
Salzberger ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1995) (1767).
7S Ackerman, supra note 56, at 1042.
74 McGinnis, supra note 9, at 303.
75 SeeJON ELSTER, EXPLAINING SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: MORE NUTS AND BOLTS FOR THE
SOCIAL SCIENCES 5 (2007) (identifying functional explanations as those that explain
behavioral patterns by describing their consequences and not their causes).
76 See Edna Ullmann-Margalit, Invisible-Hand Explanations, 39 SYNTHESE 263, 267
(1978) (arguing that the success of an invisible-hand explanation depends on the na-
ture of the mechanism that "aggregates the dispersed individual actions into the pat-
terned outcome").
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In ideal markets, there isjust such a mechanism: the price system,
enforced by competition. Economic actors who are not aiming to
produce public benefits will do so by rationally pursuing their self-
interested ends; doing so embeds information about supply and de-
mand in prices and propagates that information through the eco-
nomic system. 7' Under the idealized conditions of textbook welfare
economics, the price system ensures that all Pareto-improving trades
are consummated. However, nothing in the separation of powers sys-
tem corresponds in any robust way to the role of the price system (in
ideal markets) . 7  There is no general mechanism ensuring that the
decentralized decisions of branches will produce the optimal level of
uncertainty, except possibly in an accidental and temporary fashion.
As in the ideal market and some real markets, the separation of pow-
ers system has no central director, but it does not follow that the sepa-
ration of powers system displays "spontaneous order" or that it will
produce "mutually advantageous arrangements." Furthermore, even
if all such arrangements are made, there is no guarantee that the re-
sulting distribution of political power will be socially optimal, because
there are enduring divergences between private and social costs and
benefits.
Likewise, there is no reason to expect that interaction between na-
tional lawmaking institutions will tend to produce anything like effi-
cient customs or norms. In general, the most plausible case for the
emergence of efficient custom involves conditions of symmetry and
reciprocity, in which agents know that they will be on both sides of
similar transactions over time and thus have an incentive to follow the
rule that maximizes aggregate welfare for all concerned. The interac-
tion of lawmaking institutions is not like this; a custom that recognizes
broad executive privilege, for example, systematically favors the presi-
dency in all future interactions, and will thus predictably be supported
by Presidents and opposed by legislators, whatever its aggregate wel-
fare effects.
77 F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REv. 519, 526-27 (1945)
(arguing that the price system ought to be seen as a "mechanism for communicating
information").
78 Gary Becker suggests that interest-group pressures on legislatures produce effi-
cient legislation. See Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for
Political Influence, 98 Q.J. ECON. 371 (1983). But even if this is true, taken in isolation,
there is no guarantee that the outputs of the whole lawmaking system will be efficient;
that further thesis requires that the interaction between the legislature and the nonleg-
islative branches conduce to efficiency.
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C. Branches, Individuals, and Parties
In order to clarify our main theses, we have indulged the deliber-
ately artificial assumption that branches of the national government are
personified rational actors. Although this is a standard assumption in
constitutional theory, it is of course false.79 The interests of individuals
who fill the branches will often, perhaps systematically, diverge from the
institutional interests of those branches. Moreover, individual officials
are members of parties whose interests cut across those of institutions.
Does the lack of realism undermine our conclusions?
Relaxing the assumption of personification should generally
strengthen our conclusions, because introducing a divergence be-
tween individual and institutional interests, or party interests and in-
stitutional interests, makes it even more unlikely that institutions will
act so as to produce the socially optimal level and distribution of con-
stitutional showdowns. At worst these complications will be random
with respect to our conclusions, sometimes strengthening and some-
times weakening them.
1. Branches and Individuals
Consider, as an example, the problem of underinvestment in
showdowns that would check aggrandizement (here again defining
aggrandizement as any change that gives one institution more power
than specified in an ideal S-function). We saw two mechanisms that
might cause, for example, a current Congress to underinvest in show-
downs that would check the expanding powers of the presidency. The
first is that the current Congress would not fully internalize the inter-
est of future generations in enjoying an optimal separation of powers
system; the second is that Congress might attempt to free-ride on the
checking function of the Supreme Court (which might in turn be try-
ing to free-ride on the checking function of Congress).
The divergence between the interests of individual legislators and
the institutional interests of Congress provides a third mechanism,
quite possibly cumulative of the first two. David Hume argued, in ef-
fect, that lack of coordination among members of Parliament enabled
79 See Levinson, supra note 22, at 926-30 (arguing that government officials do not
operate to aggrandize the institutions in which they work because they pursue the in-
terests of their constituents or themselves).
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the Crown to buy a decisive bloc of legislative support on the cheap. 80
Modem commentators have extended the point, showing that because
Congress is a "they," not an "it," and because it is a "they" with many
members, legislators face severe problems of collective action in orga-
nizing to oppose the executive, even where it would be socially optimal
to do so. 8' The internal multiplicity of Congress increases the probabil-
ity that Congress as a whole will underinvest in checking the executive.
Of course, the same collective action problems that hamper Con-
gress in opposing the executive might also prevent Congress from ag-
grandizing power at the expense of the executive or the courts, and
that result might itself be socially desirable. Consider that internal
legislative disagreement, preventing formation of a sufficiently large
coalition, saved Andrew Johnson from being impeached. It has been
claimed, plausibly enough, that a successful impeachment of Johnson
would have decisively tilted the American separation of powers system
in the direction of a quasi-parliamentary form of government."
2
But there is no reason to think that this second possibility some-
how balances out the first. There is no big ledger where the beneficial
effects of internal legislative conflict balance out the detrimental ef-
fects, and no price-like mechanism makes the former equal to the lat-
ter in any event. The effects of Congress's collective action problems
are, at best, a random variable with respect to the socially optimal level
and distribution of constitutional showdowns. Once the divergence
between individual and institutional interests is taken into account,
there is even less reason to think that decentralized institutional inter-
action will have any systematic or predictable tendency to supply
showdowns in a socially desirable manner.
2. Branches and Parties
Political parties have been robust forces in the American constitu-
tional system since the early nineteenth century, and their interests
are often at variance with the interests of institutions. Either by vir-
tues of selection, incentives, or both, legislators, executive officials,
80 See Adrian Vermeule, Hume's Second-Best Constitutionalism, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 421,
428-29 (2003).
81 See Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a "They, "Not an "It": Legislative Intent as Oxy-
moron, 12 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 239 (1992).
Jon Elster, supra note 28, at 34-35 (citing ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IM-
PERIAL PRESIDENCY 74-75 (1973), and DANIEL WARE, THE FROZEN REPUBLIC: How
THE CONSTITUTION IS PARALYZING DEMOCRACY (1996)).
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and judges identify with partisan positions. The consequence is that
the separation of powers system functions differently in times of uni-
fied or divided government: under unified government, parties may
effectively reallocate constitutional authority among the branches of
government; under divided government, parties will cause interinsti-
tutional conflict and may provoke showdowns, but only to the extent
that partisan interests warrant.
8 3
However, it goes too far to claim that the American constitutional
system displays "separation of parties, not powers";8 4 rather, it displays
both separation of powers and parties in a complicated interaction.
Sometimes partisan interests come to the fore and trump the institu-
tional interests of branches. s5 On the other hand, sometimes partisan
interests are themselves secondary. In one standard case, parties are
internally fractured. The post-9/11 legislation proposed by the Bush
administration faced opposition from both civil-libertarian Republi-
cans and civil-libertarian Democrats; the resulting coalition had
enough clout to narrow the grant of new powers to the executive in
the USA PATRIOT Act.8 6 In that statute, sunset provisions were in-
cluded at the behest of the Republican leadership of the House, over
the administration's opposition.
In those cases the issue-the point at which the security-liberty
tradeoff should be struck-was single dimensional, but legislators did
not line up neatly by party along the single dimension. In other cases,
parties are fractured because issues are multidimensional. Famously,
the enactment of civil rights statutes in the later 1950s and early 1960s,
culminating in the Civil Rights Act of 1964, was greatly complicated by
the fact that geography and other affiliations cut across partisan af-
filiation; southern Democrats who used the filibuster to strangle early
civil rights proposals were eventually defeated by a coalition of north-
erners and westerners from both political parties.
Finally, in yet other cases, parties are internally cohesive and take
opposing positions, but crucial individuals place institutional interests
83 DarylJ. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV.
L. REV. 2311, 2338-47 (2006).
84 See id.
85 For cases demonstrating this, see id.
86 See 1 BERNARD D. REAMS,JR. & CHRISTOPHER T. ANGLIM, USA PATRIOT ACT: A
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE UNITING AND STRENGTHENING OF AMERICA BY PROVIDING
APPROPRIATE TOOLS REQUIRED TO INTERCEPT AND OBSTRUCT TERRORISM ACT, PUBLIC
LAW No. 107-56 (2001), at xlvi-xlvii (2002) (describing a coalition of civil libertarians of
both parties that objected to some of the administration's initial proposals, which were
never adopted).
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above partisan ones. Arlen Specter, John Warner, and Lindsey Gra-
ham, powerful Senate Republicans, have opposed the Bush administra-
tion on a range of national security issues since 9/11, in part in order to
protect the Senate's prerogatives against perceived executive aggran-
dizement. During the fight over Roosevelt's court-packing plan, crucial
Democratic members of Congress defected to the opposition, in part
because of concerns about executive tyranny-a concern that was fu-
eled by the very size of Roosevelt's partisan majority in Congress.
8 7
The mechanisms that cause partisan interests to trump, or be
trumped by, institutional interests are manifold and highly contex-
tual.8 For our purposes, the only necessary point is that constitu-
tional showdowns occur under unified as well as divided government.
In the Youngstown case,89 which clarified the limits of presidential
power, the Democratic party held the presidency, large majorities in
Congress, and a large majority on the Supreme Court. A constitu-
tional showdown occurred nonetheless, out of a mix of institutional
conflicts and personal animosities among the main actors. As Youngs-
town illustrates, showdowns under unified government may be purer
cases than under divided government: common partisan affiliation en-
sures, or is at least correlated with, common policy preferences, so the
only dispute is over the allocation of authority (as in cell (2), in Table 1
above).
Overall, it is unclear whether showdowns are more or less likely
under unified or divided government, or whether they have the same
characteristics when they do occur under either political condition.
The most that can be said is that while partisan animosity in divided
government adds some uncertain probability of conflict between
branches, the tendency under unified government to commonality of
preferences across branches clarifies that showdowns are indeed over
authority, not policy. If fewer showdowns occur under unified gov-
ernment, the ones that do occur are thus more consequential for the
allocation of powers.
One might speculate that because political parties know that they
will, roughly, alternate control of the various lawmaking institutions,
something like the symmetry of interests needed for the emergence of
87 Vermeule, supra note 3, at 1161-66.
88 For some suggestions about mechanisms that cause individuals to internalize
the interests of institutions, see Jon Elster, The Role of Institutional Interest in East Euro-
pean Constitution-Making, E. EUR. CONsT. REV., Winter 1996, at 63.
89 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
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efficient customs is present. The party temporarily in control of the
presidency knows that strengthening the presidency to excess today
will harm the party's interests when it controls (only) the legislature
tomorrow. However, this hardly guarantees the emergence of efficient
customs or norms. Because the system is a complicated and contingent
mix of separated parties and separated powers, parties lack the full ca-
pacity to produce welfare-maximizing customs even if they would wish
to do so. Partisan interests will regularly-but unpredictably-be sub-
ordinated to institutional and personal interests, and this will hamper
the partisan cooperation needed to produce efficient customs (even as-
suming that the necessary symmetry of partisan interests obtains).
D. Illustrations
Given this analysis of the divergence between private and social
costs and benefits, we should expect to find that the following condi-
tions characterize structural constitutional law: First, there is a great
deal of uncertainty about the allocation of powers across institutions,
because current institutions do not fully internalize the social benefits
of creating clarifying precedents through showdowns. Second, where
clear precedents are set, they are at least sometimes premature or un-
necessary, because institutions engage in showdowns even if it would
be socially optimal to set the precedent later, with more information,
or not at all, because the issue will not be repeated in the future.
Third, where institutions engage in showdowns, they sometimes suc-
ceed in setting bad precedents that undermine the separation of pow-
ers system through aggrandizement--defining aggrandizement by
reference to some benchmark of the optimal separation of powers.
There are, of course, pockets of structural constitutional law in
which none of these conditions hold. But nothing in the separation
of powers system guarantees they will not; nothing systematically works
in favor of optimal precedent-setting. We do not provide a compre-
hensive review, but offer some suggestive illustrations.
1. Uncertainty
Descriptively, American separation of powers law is blanketed by
the fog of uncertainty. In every subfield, major questions go unre-
solved, generation after generation, because the institutions of any
given generation avoid the showdowns that would clarify the constitu-
tional allocation. Consider some well-known examples. It is still un-
clear whether Congress can preclude judicial review of constitutional
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questions or strip the Supreme Court of jurisdiction in defined cate-
gories of cases, especially cases bearing on constitutional rights.
Broadly speaking, the reason is that the Court avoids the question
through statutory construction, and Congress does not force the issue.
In foreign relations and national security law, the constitutional
allocation of war powers is unsettled to this day in crucial respects. Al-
though historical and judicial precedents have settled some controver-
sies-for example, that the President has inherent authority to use
military force even if he is not repelling a sudden attack, and that the
President cannot seize domestic industries necessary to a war effort, at
least not if Congress has impliedly prohibited him from doing so-
many crucial questions remain unclear. Topically, there are contro-
versies about whether Congress may, by statute, prohibit President
Bush from deploying troops in Iraq, 9° and about whether repeal of the
2003 statute authorizing deployment of troops will force the President
to withdraw. It is astonishing to nonlawyers that there is no definitive
answer about what legal validity and effect these measures would have.
Here too, the reason is that in generation after generation decisive
clarification is avoided by conflict-averse institutions.
Nothing in our discussion indicates that this level of uncertainty is
higher than optimal. However, given that uncertainty is a cost, all else
equal, the massive levels of uncertainty in structural constitutional law
would have to provide massive collateral benefits to be justified-
benefits that could not be provided more cheaply through other
mechanisms. No one has convincingly identified any such benefits, or
explained why high levels of uncertainty are necessary to produce them.
2. Unnecessary Precedents
Are there unnecessary precedents-again, defined as precedents
whose costs of generation are greater than their direct plus indirect
benefits in settling future controversies-in structural constitutional
law? Consider the early controversies over the federal government's
Commerce Clause authority to build and operate "internal improve-
ments," or public goods involving infrastructure and transportation.
Although such improvements have not been controversial since the
90 See Exercising Congress's Constitutional Power To End a War: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, I I0th Cong. (2007) (statement of DavidJ. Barron, Professor of
Law, Harvard Law School), available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/news/2007/01 /
Barron%20Testimony.pdf ("In my judgment, proposals... to bring the deployment it-
self to an end through curtailment of funds fall well within [Congress's] authority.").
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early to mid-nineteenth century, the relevant legislative and judicial
precedents have shaped the later development of Commerce Clause
doctrine.9' This is plausibly a case in which D, the direct value of
precedent for future generations, was low while I, the indirect value,
was high. Given the high costs of the political conflicts surrounding
internal improvements C, perhaps C was greater than D + . A prob-
lem with this example, however, is that it is not clear that the disap-
pearance of the issue was exogenous to the setting of the precedents:
perhaps the issue disappeared only because the federal government
was found to be authorized to create the improvements and did so.
For a somewhat less ambiguous example, consider the Thirteenth
Amendment. As David Strauss emphasizes, the Civil War, not the
Thirteenth Amendment, likely ended slavery: "The most that can be
said for the Thirteenth Amendment is that it hastened the end of
slavery in a few border states by a few years."92 This, then, is a case
where D was quite low; and I also seems low, given that the Amend-
ment has not been a major source of constitutional analogies and
principles in later controversies. What makes the example slightly
ambiguous, nonetheless, is that the marginal cost of producing the
Amendment, over and above the cost of fighting the Civil War itself,
was itself low as well.
The paucity of really clean examples in this category suggests a po-
litical mechanism that may check the creation of unnecessary prece-
dents: politicians, including judges, will generally be loathe to engage
in genuinely optional showdowns. Rather, they will focus only on dis-
putes that circumstances force onto the political agenda. (Because of
the private incentive to duck even those disputes, some crucial issues
will be left shrouded in uncertainty and punted to the future, even if it
would be socially optimal to resolve them now.) If that is so, then de-
partures from optimality are likely to occur in the direction of too few
91 See generally Adam S. Grace, From the Lighthouses: How the First Federal Internal Im-
provement Projects Created Precedent that Broadened the Commerce Clause, Shrunk the Takings
Clause, and Affected Early Nineteenth Century Constitutional Debate, 68 ALB. L. REV. 97
(2004) (analyzing the development of federal law regarding infrastructure).
92 David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114 HARV. L. REV.
1457, 1480-81 (2001).
93 When scholars invoke Thirteenth Amendment principles, the arguments are
typically dismissed as excessively ingenious. Compare Akhil Reed Amar & Daniel Wi-
dawsky, Child Abuse as Slavery: A Thirteenth Amendment Response to DeShaney, 105 HARV.
L. REV. 1359 (1992) (analogizing child abuse to slavery and invoking the Thirteenth
Amendment), with RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAw 211-14 (1995) (addressing
and dismissing Amar's and Widawsky's Thirteenth Amendment analogy).
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showdowns, but unnecessary showdowns will not be a major problem;
excessive uncertainty, rather than premature or unnecessary clarity,
will be the result.
3. Showdowns and Aggrandizement
It is difficult to give evidence that showdowns can produce (not
just prevent) aggrandizement, because there is no consensus on a
normative benchmark. However, it can be shown more narrowly that
relative to a wide range of such benchmarks, aggrandizing showdowns
occur. Commentators who have very different accounts of the optimal
distribution of powers across institutions have in common the belief
that, relative to their own preferred accounts of the optimal distribu-
tion of powers, showdowns have produced aggrandizement. Consider
Robert Bork's view that the Supreme Court's power grew alarmingly
after it largely prevailed in the criminal procedure showdowns of the
1960s, while Richard Epstein holds that the power of the President
and Congress grew alarmingly when they prevailed over the Old Court
in the constitutional showdowns of the late 1930s. Bork and Epstein
have very different views about the optimal distribution of powers, but
both agree that the showdowns to which they point produced a mald-
istribution of powers relative to their preferred benchmarks.
IV. IMPLICATIONS
What recommendations flow from this analysis, if any? It is hard
to say anything very crisp in the abstract, because many of the relevant
empirical and causal questions remain unsettled. However, we will
highlight some possible counterintuitive implications of the analysis
that hold under plausible conditions. Section A critiques the passive
virtues, while Section B puts our claims in the context of some stan-
dard controversies in legal and constitutional theory.
A. The Active Virtues?
The major implication is that under certain conditions the active
virtues, the embrace of clarifying conflict, should be preferred to the
passive virtues, or the evasion of unnecessary conflict. The passive vir-
tues, which we have summarized in Part II, encourage institutions-
especially courts-to avoid unnecessary constitutional conflicts. As
against the passive virtues, however, decisive constitutional conflicts
and precedent-setting showdowns should actually be encouraged
2008]
1042 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW
where the value of waiting for more information is low, where similar
issues will frequently recur in future generations (so that the value of
settling questions now is high), and where legal uncertainty will im-
pose high costs in the future. In general, theorists of the passive vir-
tues focus to excess on option value and the benefits of avoiding con-
flict, while ignoring the opportunity cost of failures to clarify the
constitutional rules in ways that can avoid more conflict in the future.
The theorists sometimes talk as though conflict can simply be avoided
altogether. In some domains, however, there is an intertemporal
tradeoff: less institutional conflict now guarantees more institutional
conflict over time. Where aggregate future conflict, even properly
discounted, imposes greater social costs than present conflict, and
present conflict would avoid future conflict, a showdown in the cur-
rent period would be socially beneficial.
On this view, a major problem with standard accounts of the pas-
sive virtues is that they tend to take into account only the costs and
benefits to the relevant institution, usually the judiciary, rather than
overall social costs and benefits. This is usually implicit: in the judi-
cial context, consider Justice Brandeis's famous formulation, which
summarized various legal techniques for avoiding "unnecessary" con-
stitutional questions and confrontations as rules the Court has "devel-
oped[] for its own governance in the cases confessedly within its juris-
diction. 9 4 The main thrust of Brandeis's discussion, and of some of
Brandeis's later exegeses, is that the Court's institutional position and
prestige benefit by avoiding showdowns. But, as we have emphasized,
the social costs and benefits of avoiding or engaging in showdowns are
different than the private or institutional costs and benefits.
Theorists of the passive virtues sometimes say, or implicitly sug-
gest, that what benefits the courts also benefits the overall system of
separation of powers: what is good for the Court is good for the coun-
try. Thus in the judicial setting, the passive virtues can be defended as
a device for husbanding the judiciary's prestige over the long run,
enabling it to defend individual rights or to enforce the rule of law in
times of great crisis.9 5 It is unclear whether this indirect account of
social benefits has had much motivating power for the judges, as com-
94 Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring).
95 See GEYH, supra note 17, at 224-43 (discussing methods ofjudicial avoidance and
providing examples); cf JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL PO-
LITICAL PROCESS 129-70 (1980) (arguing that the Supreme Court should preserve its
institutional capital by avoiding questions of federalism or separation of powers).
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pared to the short-run benefits to the Court itself of avoiding constitu-
tional showdowns when in a position of weakness, but let us suppose
that it has been motivational. Still, the social benefit of preserving the
Court's long-run prestige captures only one side of the social ledger.
The other side of the ledger includes the social cost of legal uncer-
tainty and the conflict it breeds in future periods.
It is conceptually possible that, even if the Court's interests and
the nation's interests diverge in some range of cases, it is nonetheless
good for the nation to have Justices who think that what is good for
the Court is also good for the nation. The implicit theory would be
one of Madisonian competition. Even if the first-best is to have offi-
cials in all institutions who act for the public interest, the attainable
second-best might be to have officials in all institutions who act for the
interests of their institutions, thus producing a kind of equilibrium
convergence on the public interest.
But as we have argued, Madisonian "competition" rests on a false
analogy to markets. In the separation of powers system, there is no in-
visible-hand mechanism that systematically aligns the decentralized
pursuit of institutional interests with social welfare or the public good,
however those notions are construed. It is not that institutional inter-
ests and the nation's interests are systematically opposed, any more
than they are systematically aligned. It is that whether they are op-
posed or aligned is a matter of circumstance, differing across cases;
there is no basis for even a presumption that the overall good will be
attained by institutions pursuing their interests in a decentralized
manner. A system of that sort can result in too few showdowns, too
many showdowns, or the wrong types of showdowns at the wrong time.
Under certain conditions, then-where the value of setting
precedents now is especially high, because similar issues will recur in
future generations and little new information will be gained by de-
lay-the active virtues are superior to the passive virtues from the so-
cial point of view. We do not claim that these conditions are more
common than the conditions under which the passive virtues are so-
cially desirable. All we claim is that the theorists of the passive virtues
systematically fail to consider the full range of social costs and bene-
fits, and are too sanguine about their conflict-avoiding prescriptions.
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B. Controversies in Legal Theory
1. Precedent
One of our themes is that the resolution of conflicts over constitu-
tional authority establishes judicial or nonjudicial precedents that
guide the conduct of future agents. There is a direct analogy in the
practice of common law courts, which similarly resolve disputes that
establish precedents that guide future courts faced with similar dis-
putes. When courts resolve disputes, they frequently resolve unsettled
questions about jurisdiction-which court has authority over the dis-
pute-and questions about the authority of other government institu-
tions. Courts tend to respect earlier courts' decisions about both
questions even though there is no external force that could sanction
courts for failing to do so.
Many scholars have provided explanations for this phenomenon.
Typically, they rely on repeated game ideas, where an agent who fails
to respect a precedent will find that its own precedents are not re-
spected in the future.96 Our purpose here is not to apply these ideas
directly to the problem at hand, butjust to point out that our problem
is one of a general class that has received a great deal of attention in
the literature. This is the problem of how institutions (or people)
maintain their respective roles in the absence of an external power
that can sanction them from overstepping the limits of their authority.
Much constitutional scholarship assumes that the judiciary is this ex-
ternal power, but, as should be clear from our discussion, we do not
think that courts can serve this role. Instead, they are simply one of
several agents that maintain their power in part by limiting their ambi-
tions and in part by challenging other institutions that attempt to en-
force a limited rather than expansive judicial role.
What we have called ambiguous acquiescence also has an analogy
in the common law practices of courts. Sometimes, courts decide
cases on alternative grounds, which weakens the precedential effect of
the decision. In addition, courts will often decide cases without issu-
ing reasoned opinions or decide cases with opinions that are deemed
nonprecedential. Not all of these strategies have the same effect, but in
general they can be thought of as situations where courts economize on
decision costs and so come to outcomes that they believe should pro-
96 See, e.g., Eric Rasmusen, Judicial Legitimacy as a Repeated Game, 10 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 63 (1994) (developing a game-theoretic model ofjudicial legitimacy).
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vide minimal guidance for future courts. Such a strategy is most war-
ranted when the issues raised by the dispute are unlikely to recur.
2. Evolving Constitutions and Constitutional Moments
Much constitutional law scholarship concerns the nature of con-
stitutional development or evolution. Textualists and originalists be-
lieve that the Constitution changes only through amendment, but this
view is best taken as a normative argument. Few people dispute that
the meaning of the Constitution has changed a great deal since the
founding. Judicial precedents provide the obvious examples, but the
working out of authority between the executive and legislative
branches, and between the national and state governments, is equally
important, although the documentary record is less clear.
How does the Constitution change, as a positive matter, if the
formal amendment procedure is not used? One view draws on the
analogy to common law development. Judges interpret constitutional
provisions in light of new conditions not anticipated by the founders,
in doing so subtly (and sometimes not so subtly) changing its mean-
ing. Over time, these interpretations accrete and yield new allocations
of power. 9' Another view finds constitutional change in moments of
upheaval when the public is supposedly attuned to politics and consti-
tutional issues to a greater extent than in normal times. The Civil War
and the New Deal are cited as examples. The public approves of
changes in higher law, and these changes are duly respected by politi-
cal actors.9s
The implicit picture on which we rely is neither as judge-centered
as the first account nor as episodic as the second: constitutional
showdowns occur regularly, but the most frequent and important
cases occur outside the courts. We think of constitutional change as a
routine phenomenon that political actors have a special role in pro-
voking. Public constitutional sentiment evolves in subterranean fash-
ion, generally unperceived by those who exercise power. However,
when political agents disagree about the allocation of authority, they
must make predictions about how the public will react if a showdown
occurs. The agents subtly shift their allocation claims in response
97 See David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REv.
877, 884-91 (1996) (describing constitutional change as a common law process).
98 See 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 3-31 (1998) (examining higher law-
making generally); ACKERMAN, supra note 4, at 266-69 (considering higher lawmaking
in the context of the New Deal).
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both to their predictions about public reaction and to the clarifying
effects of showdowns when they actually occur.
We said that our positive picture of constitutional development is
inconsistent with originalism. However, it is plausibly consistent with
(a suitably specified version of) popular constitutionalism, although
the sponginess of the latter approach makes it hard to be sure. Some
"popular" constitutionalists seem to envision widespread and genu-
inely inclusive debate over constitutional meaning,9 while others tend
to focus on political movements among the educated and other el-
ites.'°° In our approach, the elites who control the institutions of gov-
ernment effectively decide whether or not to engage in precedent-
setting showdowns, but public constitutional sentiment-which may
or may not be very popular, depending on circumstances-is both a
major political constraint and a major variable in the elites' political
calculations. The populace at large exercises an indirect influence
over constitutional development, but as a filter that rules out certain
elite positions and as an ultimate court of appeal, rather than as a
front-line participant.
3. Judicial Review and Deference
The positive claim that constitutional development occurs
through precedent-generating showdowns and the normative claim
that the judiciary and other institutions will produce social benefits by
embracing the active virtues under identifiable conditions both cut
across standard controversies about judicial review of legislation and
executive action for constitutionality. Nothing in the idea of a prece-
dent-generating showdown, or in our prescription for the active vir-
tues, requires aggressive judicial review on the merits; to think so is to
confuse legal certainty or clarification with the content of the legal
rules. A showdown that decisively clarifies the power of the Supreme
Court in a certain domain might produce expansive judicial power, or
instead a great deal of judicial deference-perhaps something like
James Bradley Thayer's rule that courts would overturn legislation on
constitutional grounds only when the legislature has made a "clear
99 See generally LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITU-
TIONALISM ANDJUDICIAL REVIEW (2004).
100 See Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Protecting the Constitution from the People:
Juricentric Restrictions on Section Five Power, 78 IND. L.J. 1 (2003) (addressing the
Rehnquist Court's assumption of authority over constitutional questions that would
otherwise be entrusted to Congress).
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mistake" about constitutionality.""° Thus showdowns over social and
economic regulation in the 1930s clarified that the Court would take a
Thayerian, highly deferential approach to review under the Com-
merce Clause 10 2 and would essentially cease enforcing the so-called
"nondelegation doctrine. " '°' Bracketing the intensity of judicial re-
view, which might be low or high on the merits, the positive benefit of
clarification for future generations is the same.
Conversely, neither the passive virtues nor minimalism have any
necessary connection to the intensity of judicial review. The passive
virtues can be used to avoid backlash against intrusive constitutional
decisions and to harbor judicial capital for aggressive judicial review in
a future period, as when the Warren Court ducked the inflammatory
issue of the constitutionality of antimiscegenation laws. 0 4  On the
other hand, the passive virtues can instead be used as part of a long-
term practice that cuts the judiciary out of certain questions, leaving
in place whatever status quo arrangements legislators and the Presi-
dent have worked out. An example of the latter form of the passive
virtues, discussed above, is the long-term judicial practice of ducking
questions about the constitutional allocation of war powers. So too
with minimalism: narrow and shallow decisions can be deferential to
government on the merits, or not deferential. The issue of deference
is orthogonal to the question of whether constitutional decisions
should be minimalist or maximalist.
CONCLUSION
Good lawyers advise their clients to settle because litigation is a
costly and risky process, and clients frequently overestimate the gains
and underestimate the costs. But in the constitutional setting, where
the choice is between settlement and showdown, rather than settle-
ment and trial, the costs and benefits are not the same. Settlements
avoid diversion of the government's energy away from the problem at
hand, but the showdown is an important engine of constitutional de-
101 SeeJames B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional
Law, 7 HARV. L. RE,. 129, 144 (1893) (arguing that judicial review should use a "clear
mistake" standard).
102 See NLRB v.Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 49 (1937) (holding that far-
reaching federal regulation of industry is within Congress's Commerce Clause power).
103 See Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 785 (1948) (allowing Congress to
grant substantial discretion to officials).
104 See Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 891, 891 (1955) (refusing to consider the merits be-
cause of an inadequate record).
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velopment, and sometimes the only way to realign institutional lines of
authority with public sentiment is through confrontation. In the case
of public law, as with some types of public-law litigation, confrontation
benefits third parties and future generations by clarifying the rules of
the game. °5 Well-motivated constitutional actors in the present will
take this benefit into account.
1o Cf Fiss, supra note 66 (discussing the costs of settlement to third parties who
are deprived of useful precedents).
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